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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute and the risk it poses to 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty and resource extraction in the North as the effects of climate change 
become more apparent. The confluence of environmental change, national level policies, 
international governance regimes, and how they come together to govern the Beaufort Sea is, of 
utmost concern to Canada and relations with Arctic partners, including, most notably, the United 
States of America (US). Therefore, this paper integrates thinking from each of these fields to 
explore the history, status, role and future relevance of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary 
dispute in Arctic governance debates to analyze the linkages between Arctic sovereignty and 
energy development. More fundamentally, this paper seeks to understand why the dispute has 
not been resolved, what a resolution may look like, and who stands to benefit, through an 
analysis of the role of international law as it relates to the seas to determine what this says about 
the current stakes and interests involved there. 
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Foreword 
Part of the purpose of academic scholarship is the identification of what is known and the 
pursuit of what is unknown so that it could be known. In this regard, the foundational research of 
what is known and not known about the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute was first 
encountered in a study of the subject through two courses. The first, Readings in Environmental 
Studies, delved into the nature of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. It led to the determination that 
concern over the defense of Canadian Arctic sovereignty is more an anxiety over the 
determinable limits of Canadian maritime territory, and not an infringement of Canada’s existing 
territorial sovereignty. This conclusion led to a study during a second course, an Individually 
Directed Study, exploring the role and scope of international law in fomenting an Arctic 
governance regime. Focus was placed on the historical development of international maritime 
law and its principles, and how these continue to reflect current state behaviour under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Specific attention was paid to areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, particularly as the effects of global climate change continue to alter 
the Arctic environment at an irreversible rate. These courses were important to the development 
of this paper because they provided necessary introductory bibliographic material that allowed 
for a more strategic methodological approach to develop, and thus, for this research to proceed 
further. 
As such, this paper questions the structure, role, and the challenges the Beaufort Sea 
maritime boundary dispute poses to Canadian Arctic sovereignty and resource extraction with a 
particular focus on Arctic marine environmental changes, how the dispute arose, why it still 
exists, and its connection to potential for natural resource (namely oil and gas) development in 
the North. More generally however, it is linked to my Area of Concentration and its Components 
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through a focus on the difficulties associated with balancing social, political, economic and 
environmental governance in the Arctic Ocean. These linkages centre on Canadian oceans 
science and policy which considers the relevant scientific data addressing problems faced by 
Canada’s oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic), in terms of pollution and use, but also in terms of 
policy development, legal issues, and the political and economic stakes involved in pursuing 
such use. This has entailed delving into current debates about oceans governance globally, and 
how other nations are dealing with the legal, jurisdictional, political, and economic consequences 
associated with use of their adjacent ocean amidst acidification, pollution, and warming.  
Among other issues are problems of regulation, administration, myths of abundance and 
scarcity, and the difficulty of balancing a variety of interests that range from economic 
development, strategic military positions, indigenous land claims and sensitive ecologies. 
International legal regimes attempt to bring these interests together based on an emerging 
scientific and ecological consensus behind specific oceanic changes, although the adequacy of 
these is debatable. A particular response is required that must be cooperative, interactive, 
interdisciplinary, and integrative. It must involve various groups ranging from government, 
private industry, and academia, to civil society, non-governmental organizations, Aboriginal 
nations, and more. This confluence of scientific challenges, national level policies, international 
legal regimes, and how they come together to govern the oceans, is of utmost concern. This 
paper attempts to integrate thinking from each of these domains to gain an integrated, 
interdisciplinary perspective from which to analyse contemporary problems impacting the 
world’s ocean resources, and in this case, those of the Beaufort Sea.  
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Chapter One: An Introduction 
Environmental changes in the Arctic Ocean are stimulating responses from bordering 
coastal states that have the potential to dramatically shape how questions of Arctic sovereignty 
are resolved, with implications for resource extraction across the North. One of these responses 
came from the federal government of Canada in 2009 in reaction to increased attention on the 
Canadian Arctic. Publishing under the authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, the federal government released Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our 
Heritage, Our Future (the Northern Strategy), describing the vision of the Government for the 
Canadian North in the present, geared toward future investment into the region and linked to a 
past celebrating the vastness of the North and its “rightful place within a strong and sovereign 
Canada”.1 Four priority areas were emphasized and focused around exercising Arctic 
sovereignty; promoting social and economic development; protecting the North’s environmental 
heritage; and devolving northern governance “so that Northerners have a greater say in their own 
destiny”.2 
Similarly, the priorities espoused by the Northern Strategy have also been applied to 
foreign policy in the Arctic region, demonstrated in the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign 
Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (the Foreign 
Policy Statement). Both policy documents share the same fundamental vision for a Canadian 
Arctic: the assurance that Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is of utmost importance in the 
pursuit of social and economic development as attempts are made to safeguard the environment 
                                               
1 Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, 
Our Heritage, Our Future, published 2009, available from: <http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf>, 
(accessed March 21, 2012), at introduction (c). 
2 Ibid., at introduction (d). 
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and promote good government by devolving governance to more local levels of government 
through the inclusion of Northern peoples in decision-making processes.
3
 
The Northern Strategy addresses the concept of sovereignty very basically, asserting that 
“Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding, well-established and based on historic title, 
founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples since time immemorial.”4 
This assertion is tied to the notion that the exercise of such sovereignty includes the maintenance 
of a “strong presence in the North,”5 including the significant endorsement of military 
expenditures. 
The Foreign Policy Statement addresses the exercise of sovereignty in a similar way, 
asserting that “the first and most important pillar towards recognizing the potential of Canada’s 
Arctic is the exercise of our sovereignty over the Far North.”6 In it, the Harper Government has 
signaled that it is committed to “a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined boundaries, 
dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and healthy and productive 
ecosystems”.7 It further delineates that sovereignty in the Arctic is exercised through domestic 
laws and regulations, indicating a lack of militarization and force in conducting Arctic matters, 
and more of a commitment to stewardship.
8
  
However, the Foreign Policy Statement seeks to complement the exercise of sovereignty 
in the Canadian Arctic in three main ways, including the resolution of boundary issues according 
to international law, international recognition of the limits of an extended continental shelf that 
                                               
3 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: 
Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad, published August 20, 2010, available 
from: <http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf>, (accessed 
Nov. 9, 2010), at 2-3. 
4 Northern Strategy, at 9. 
5 Ibid., at 9. 
6 Foreign Policy Statement, at 4. 
7 Ibid., at 2. 
8 Ibid., at 5. 
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will see an exercise of sovereign rights over resources located there, and addressing Arctic 
governance issues, as well as issues around public safety.
9
 Between the documents, a mixed 
message is received: whether to exercise sovereignty through military expenditures, to pursue a 
program of stewardship on the basis of law and a commitment to healthy people and 
environments, or both?  
Since 2007 the question of sovereignty has not been attributed to a particular 
disagreement or boundary dispute but to initiatives and strategies that increase the ability of 
Canada to “monitor, patrol, and protect land, sea, and sky,” particularly through the purchase of 
new icebreakers and patrol ships.
10
 This was supposed to include a $7.4 billion price tag for the 
purchase, operation, and maintenance of up to eight new armed ships that would patrol Canadian 
Arctic waters,
11
 although this has recently been reduced to six.
12
 There is some doubt as to the 
utility of these ships in Arctic waters, however, as icebreakers would typically still be 
necessary.
13
  
The expansion of the Canadian Rangers, from 4100 to 5000 costing $12 million a year, 
and the establishment of a new Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay were 
also supposed to be forthcoming.
14
 Due to budgetary constraints this facility will now be located 
in old government buildings.
15
 The Harper Government also promised $100 million to upgrade 
the port at Nanisivik,
16
 but will now use abandoned wharves from former Nanisivik mines.
17
  
                                               
9 Ibid., at 6. 
10 Ibid., at 5. 
11 Bruce Campion-Smith, “PM’s vessels ‘aren’t what we need for the Arctic’,” TheStar.com, published July 10, 
2007, available from: <http://www.thestar.com/News/article/234198>, (accessed July 28, 2011).  
12 Shelagh D. Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Toronto: Douglas and 
McIntyre Publishers Inc., 2010), at 443. 
13 Ibid., at 443. 
14 Ken S. Coates, et.al., Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 
2008), at 180. 
15 Grant, at 443. 
16 Coates, et.al., at 180. 
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Other initiatives include the final $40 million toward scientific research grants associated 
with the International Polar Year, $8 million in the upgrade of Port Churchill, as well as $60 
million in the improvement of the Hudson Bay Rail Line into Port Churchill.
18
 Military exercises 
have also already begun in 2010 involving a collaboration with the US and Denmark in 
Operation Nanook, an annual sovereignty exercise “demonstrating control over the air, land and 
sea within our jurisdiction”.19 
The commitment to a preliminary militarization of the Canadian Arctic is intended to 
complement three priority areas at the international level, revealing more salient points behind 
the reasons for an exercise in the assertion of Canadian sovereignty amid uncertainty. These 
include: the resolution of boundary issues, international recognition of an extended continental 
shelf that would lead to sovereign rights over resources contained there, and Arctic governance 
issues.
20
 
Further, in a comment from proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defense in March 2010, the phrase “Arctic sovereignty” was determined to be 
indicative of a lack of sovereignty, confusing the term sovereignty with security.
21
 Professor 
Whitney Lackenbauer distinguished between these two concepts and demonstrated that 
“sovereignty is actually a legal concept which entails ownership and the right to control over a 
specific area regulated by a clearly defined set of international laws”.22 Alan Kessel, a legal 
advisor to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, agreed with this 
                                                                                                                                                       
17 Grant, at 443. 
18 Coates, et.al., at 180-181. 
19 Foreign Policy Statement, at 6. 
20 Ibid., at 6. 
21 Senate of Canada, Third Session, Fortieth Parliament, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defense, “Interim Report: Special Study on the National Security and Defense Policies of Canada,” 
published March 2011, available from: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/403/defe/rep/rep07mar11-
e.pdf>, (accessed Nov. 20, 2011), at 1. 
22 Ibid., at 1. 
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assessment, also suggesting that Canada does not claim sovereignty of the Arctic under the 
modern international law of the sea because this historic title is already well established.
23
 As 
such, it is the exercise of this sovereignty, not the claiming of sovereignty, that has become part 
of Canada’s current Arctic policy, that is, securing the portion that belongs to Canada becomes 
an exercise of sovereignty. Thus, states are not engaging in an enlargement of territory through 
conquest, or other means, but are rather “identifying the seabed area outside their 200 nautical 
mile (230 miles or 368 kilometers) economic zones where they have the exclusive right to 
exploit resources” as identified by international law.24 
Accordingly, the Northern Strategy and the Foreign Policy Statement espouse two 
different understandings of what sovereignty is. Under international law, sovereignty is defined 
as the “totality of different forms of exclusive jurisdiction exercised by the state within its 
boundaries,”25 thus giving a people the right to “freely determine their political status,”26 much 
like the objectives promoted by the Northern Strategy. The Foreign Policy Statement takes a 
different approach, advocating for the exercise of sovereignty including the ability of the state to 
“exercise recognized rights of exclusive jurisdiction within a territorially delimited space,”27 as 
well as “a claim about the way power is or should be exercised.”28  
The Foreign Policy Statement also makes very clear that Canada will attempt to resolve 
boundary issues in the region based on international law, and maintains that the sovereignty of 
these lands is largely undisputed. The limits of Arctic Ocean waters, like other oceanic coastal 
                                               
23 Ibid., at 1. 
24 Coates, et.al., at 139. 
25 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North (Vancouver: Douglas & 
McIntyre Publishers Inc., 2010), at 5. 
26 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North, at 7. 
27 Franklyn Griffiths, “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty: Time to Take Yes for an Answer on the Northwest Passage,” 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, presented to DFAIT October 2007, available from: 
<http://www.irpp.org/books/archive/AOTS4/griffiths.pdf>, (accessed Aug. 1, 2011), at 3. 
28 Monica Tennberg, Arctic Environmental Cooperation: A Study in Governmentality (England: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd. 2000), at 13. 
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zones, are governed by an international legal framework under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). There are two important features to this. The more evident 
one is that UNCLOS provides for an international legal framework, giving consistency, vision, 
and legitimacy to maritime laws globally. The other, less evident feature is that UNCLOS 
represents a continuum of maritime laws dating back millennia and culminating in legislation 
that fits current needs and circumstances. Whereas previous laws related to the legal climate of 
the period and were often dictated by ruling and imperial nations, today’s laws are committed to 
voluntarily by nation states.
29
  
There are four boundary issues that Canada faces in the Arctic, though none of which 
pose a threat to sovereignty in any immediate way. Hans Island, for instance, is the only disputed 
land territory between Canada and Denmark but poses no threat to either nation as it is only 1.3 
square kilometers long and is being used for scientific purposes.
30
 The Lincoln Sea dispute also 
between Canada and Denmark concerns maritime delimitations along a particular coastline with 
small islands involved and it is in no threat of escalating.
31
 The Northwest Passage (NWP) 
dispute is neither a boundary nor border disagreement, but a dispute over definition and 
interpretation of historical legal precedent which may have an impact on the loss of some 
sovereign rights as the gateway between the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic Ocean. It is a 
disagreement with the US about whether the definition favours either Canada (NWP is an 
internal water subject to Canadian law and environmental standards) or the US (NWP is an 
international strait subject to international law and environmental standards) with the implication 
                                               
29 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, eds., “Chapter 7: The Law of the Sea and Protection of the 
Marine Environment,” in International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), at 14-15. 
30 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North, at 25. 
31 Ibid., at 105-106. 
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that either Canadian or international shipping laws, taxes, and regulations would be applied, 
having environmental, security, and economic ramifications.
32
 
Though not directly threatening Canadian Arctic sovereignty, perhaps the most 
contentious dispute, and the one with the greatest potential effect on Canada from an 
environmental, economic, political, and social perspective is the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary 
dispute, which concerns an area of 6,250 square nautical miles of ocean and seafloor claimed by 
both Canada and the United States.
33
  It is a shallow area of the Arctic Ocean between Alaska 
and the Canadian Arctic archipelago, north of the Mackenzie River delta, containing vast 
hydrocarbon resources.
34
 The Foreign Policy Statement suggests that it is a disagreement 
regarding a maritime boundary, although its description in the document is located in a section 
dealing specifically with sovereignty issues. Consequently, this paper asks the question of 
whether broadly painting the entire Canadian Arctic region as an area to be defended under 
national sovereignty is a correct framing of the situation according to principles of international 
law given that an unresolved dispute, the Beaufort Sea dispute, has not been labeled as such. 
Therefore, Arctic sovereignty claims actually concern “maritime delimitation” with 
boundaries and jurisdictional zones disputed,
35
 and relate to contentions over boundaries 
“between areas subject to sovereign rights rather than full sovereignty” like that of continental 
shelves, as opposed to where territories on land meet (that is, borders).
36
 It is thus my intention in 
this paper to explore the history, status, role and future relevance of the Beaufort Sea maritime 
boundary dispute in Arctic governance debates to analyze the linkages between Arctic 
                                               
32 Donald McRae, Behind the Headlines: Arctic Sovereignty? What is at Stake? (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs, 2007), at 14-15. 
33 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defense, “Interim Report,” at 33. 
34 James S. Baker and Michael Byers, “Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary 
Dispute,” Ocean Development and International Law 43:1 (2012), 71. 
35 Davor Vidas, Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 10. 
36 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North, at 6. 
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sovereignty and energy development. More fundamentally, this paper will seek to understand 
why it has not been resolved, what a resolution may look like, and who stands to benefit through 
an analysis of the role of international law as it relates to the seas historically and in the present 
to determine what this says about current interests involved there. 
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Methodology 
The purpose of this research is to identify what the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary 
dispute suggests about the politics and interests at play in contemporary Arctic sovereignty 
debates. Specifically, I seek to know whether maritime boundary issues are always questions of 
national sovereignty. Does this depend on international law? What is the significance of naming 
it a sovereignty dispute or a maritime boundary dispute? Does it matter that natural resources are 
located in the disputed area? Is sovereignty a catch-all phrase fitting a particular narrative the 
government is employing that seeks to set claims on state territory without regard to international 
law? 
The evidence and data needed to answer this question are varied. This research includes 
an engagement with literature concerning international law, sovereignty, specific political and 
economic interests, as well as scientific studies. This examination will take place over the course 
of seven chapters.  
Chapter one, “An Introduction,” discusses the effect of framing current Arctic 
sovereignty debates around a defense of this sovereignty by outlining the main parameters set by 
the current Canadian government through both the Foreign Policy Statement and the Northern 
Strategy. The first chapter then proceeds to describe the role of international maritime law as it 
relates to the Arctic sovereignty debate and its direct connection to the current status of the 
Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute, as well as the methodological approach to be taken 
throughout. 
The second chapter, “The Arctic Environment and the Beaufort Sea,” explores the 
important role of a changing climate, its effect on Arctic coastlines, and more specifically, on sea 
ice floes pertaining to the Beaufort Sea. For an introductory assessment of Arctic environmental 
10 
 
changes, the seminal Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, edited by Hassol (2004), is utilized. 
However, for more specific effects around the Beaufort Sea, its sea ice floes, and weather 
patterns, reliance is placed predominantly on research conducted by a number of scientists 
working on the Canadian Arctic Shelf Exchange Study, working for Natural Resources Canada 
(Frugal and Prowse), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Arctic Report 
Card, 2011. These studies examine the effects a changing climate is having on questions of 
national jurisdiction by demonstrating that the limits of the continental shelf are changing as sea 
ice extent is altered. This includes work by Yang (2009) on downwelling variability in the 
Beaufort Sea, Asplin, Lukovich, and Barber (2009) on interannual sea ice and atmospheric 
forcing contributing to sea ice motion and diminishment, as well as other articles they also 
authored with Proshutinsky and Krishfield (2009) on environmental variability in the Beaufort 
Gyre and Galley (et.al. 2009) discussing pack ice in the southern Beaufort Sea. 
As such, environmental impacts cannot be underestimated in the Arctic, and the Beaufort 
Sea is no exception, as melting sea ice prompts a redrawing of borders, particularly as it concerns 
coastal areas. These delineations are governed by laws, both domestic and international, under 
the UNCLOS. In this regard, chapter three, “The Development of Sea Law,” examines the 
historical development of international maritime law, focusing on its universalizing effect, and 
its ability to create and sustain order among sovereign states competing for territory and 
resources. This is accomplished through a focus on the work of Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, 
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (2005), The International Law of the Sea 
(2010) by Rothwell and Stephens, and the UNCLOS itself, to explain how law regarding the seas 
has evolved into its present form. 
11 
 
Chapter four, “The International Law of the Sea and the Canadian Arctic,” follows from 
this analysis, exploring international maritime law in the present context and emphasizing its role 
in the Canadian Arctic. Focus is placed on the development of Canada’s submission to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) as a tool for the recognition of Arctic 
territory as Canadian territory, including efforts to secure the disputed area of the Beaufort Sea. 
In turn, this chapter explores the role that new principles for oceans governance can have on 
international maritime law in guiding state behaviour and their potential influence on Canadian 
law and policy. The first part of the chapter relies on literature from Riddell-Dixon (“Meeting the 
Deadline: Canada’s Arctic Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf,” 2011), Elferink and Rothwell (The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and 
Jurisdiction, 2001), and Reichert (“Determination of the Outer Continental Shelf Limits and the 
Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” 2009) for information regarding 
the current application of international maritime law to the Arctic continental shelf. The latter 
part of the chapter focuses more on the adaptability of international law to current oceans 
governance dilemmas concerning the way space is used, entailing the utilization of primary 
material in the form of conventions (Aarhus, OSPAR), declarations (Rio, Stockholm), as well as 
other multilateral agreements such as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. 
The link between the evolution of international maritime law and sovereign jurisdiction 
over a specific territory is explored further in chapter five, “The Beaufort Sea Maritime 
Boundary Dispute,” to demonstrate a link between resource rights and sovereignty. This chapter 
conceives of this link through two conceptions: first, that international environmental and 
maritime law attempts to balance sovereign interests (Brunnée), and second, that Canada has 
espoused an Arctic policy instituting the defense of this sovereignty (Foreign Policy Statement 
12 
 
and Northern Strategy). The two can be mutually exclusive or can be complimentary, which is 
how the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute arose in the first place; competing sovereign 
nations vying for resources of a territory while simultaneously abiding by, and supported by, 
international law.  
Prominence is also given to an article by Baker and Byers outlining the Beaufort Sea 
maritime boundary dispute in detail called “Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea 
Maritime Boundary Dispute,” from the journal Ocean Development and International Law. As 
well, this chapter includes a number of comments from influential policy leaders in the United 
States discussing the potential for Senate approval of the UNCLOS including Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, and Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta. American accession to the UNCLOS is important in this respect, 
signaling a commitment to the rules established by international law, and a commitment to 
cooperative action in the Arctic. 
Consequently, the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute uniquely symbolizes the 
evolution of the international law of the sea, driven by a changing Arctic environment, 
modifications to legal principles, and ultimately, the stakes involved; the subject of chapter six, 
“The High Stakes of Resource Development in the Beaufort Sea.” This chapter considers the 
potential for resource extraction in the Beaufort Sea, suggesting that motivation for the pursuit of 
the defense of Canadian Arctic sovereignty is guided by the economic potential of this area. For 
a determination of the amount of resources available, statistics from the US Geological Survey 
are used, as well as an article by Griffiths entitles “US-Canada Arctic border dispute key to 
maritime riches” describing the limits of these resources. Work by Emmerson (The Future 
13 
 
History of the Arctic) and Matthews (“Oil: How Canada is Dealing with its High North”) are 
utilized to describe historical exploration and production of oil and gas in the Canadian Arctic.  
Also, a number of primary documents from the Auditor General of Canada (“1983 
Report”), the National Energy Board (Filing Requirements for Offshore Drilling in the Canadian 
Arctic), and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (Northern 
Oil and Gas Annual Report, 2011) are referenced to discuss how Canada is dealing with the 
prospects of Arctic oil and gas exploration, discovery, and production. These are tied back to the 
role of international law by Ong and his book, The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, to 
conclude chapter six. 
Chapter seven, “Conclusions,” summarizes these thoughts and ties the examination 
together by offering a number of possible solutions to the dispute as demonstrated by Byers in 
Who Owns the Arctic?, by McRae in Behind the Headlines: Arctic Sovereignty? What is at 
Stake?, and Parks in Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty: Resources, Climate and Conflict. What is 
concluded, however, is that a distinct history has influenced the principles espoused today by 
international maritime law and that a new application for international maritime law concerning 
coastal states is emerging in the Canadian Arctic territory. Thus, Canada must adapt to these 
changing circumstances, precipitated by a changing Arctic environment. This changing Arctic 
environment, in turn, is guiding particular economic interests in the area, especially as it 
concerns natural resources that may be found in the disputed, and adjoining, territory of the 
Beaufort Sea. Canada and the US both seek sovereign jurisdiction over this area but these 
circumstances have been incorrectly labelled as threats to Canadian sovereignty and actually 
concern the proper delimitation of a maritime boundary, within which may be found immense 
natural resource reserves. 
14 
 
Chapter Two: The Arctic Environment and the Beaufort Sea 
Limited sunlight, ice cover that inhibits energy penetration, low mean and extreme 
temperatures, low species diversity and biological productivity and long-lived organisms with 
high lipid levels all contribute to the sensitivity of the Arctic ecosystem and cause it to be 
easily damaged. This vulnerability of the Arctic to pollution requires that action be taken now, 
or degradation may become irreversible.37  
 
 When the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy was agreed to by eight Arctic 
countries in a series of meetings beginning in 1989 in Rovaniemi, Finland, and concluding in 
1991, a joint action plan was conceived. It sought to limit resource development activities to 
those that are sustainably developed, required parties to commit to assessing potential 
environmental impacts from these activities, and involved protecting the Arctic marine 
environment cooperatively based on leading scientific evidence and the best practices.
38
 While 
bringing a changing Arctic environment to the attention of the state in an international setting, a 
comprehensive understanding of those potential changes, and their magnitude, was undervalued, 
underappreciated, and underestimated. 
About twenty years later, states have independently developed their own strategic 
initiatives to act on the adverse affects the Arctic environment is facing, based on some of the 
goals stated under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Canada’s response is contained 
in the Northern Strategy, and the Foreign Policy Statement outlined in Chapter One. These 
documents suggest that interest in Canada’s Arctic territory is growing and putting pressure on 
the government to develop a strategy to deal with this territory. Canada has chosen to do so by 
emphasizing its role as steward of the North amidst increasing domestic and international interest 
                                               
37 The Arctic Council, Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment: The Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy, Arctic Council Chairmanship Secretariat, updated 2007, available from: 
<http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf>, (accessed April 7, 2012), at 6. 
38 Ibid., at 7. 
15 
 
in the Arctic region, particularly from industry, as the impacts of climate change rapidly alter the 
landscape.  
The Arctic and its environment cannot be easily defined, however, as it means many 
different things to many different people and has changed over time as well, directly correlating 
to what was known, or thought to have been known at the time, indicating a historical component 
in the interpretation of how to deal with and approach the area. According to one interpretation, 
the Arctic can be referred to “as comprising all areas lying north of 66°33’,” where the Arctic 
Circle begins.
39
 While encompassing, this definition is useful in delineating geographic certainty 
but, as Grant points out, is somewhat inaccurate as it does not take into account “vast areas of 
treeless tundra located well south of the Arctic Circle, although having all the physical attributes 
of a polar landscape”.40 Thus, a more appropriate definition, particularly favoured among 
scientists is to identify the area where the boundary is set by continuous permafrost or the area 
north of 10°C July isotherm, that is, “north of the region that has a mean July temperature of 
10°C,” although as the climate continues to change as will be shown, such a boundary could still 
be altered.
41
 
Yet another description focuses on the tree line instead of temperature. Thus, the Arctic 
would consist of “lands and waters lying north of the tree line- the boundary between the stunted 
coniferous forest and the northern tundra- to delineate the Arctic region from the Subarctic taiga 
that lies between the tree line and the closed canopy forests of the south”.42 In some instances, 
the Subarctic can be even colder than the more northern reaches of the region because it does not 
benefit from the warming effect of the Arctic Ocean as much, and typically has greater snowfall 
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as opposed to the north where high winds prevail. The definition varies based on the subject 
matter discussed, so for the purposes of this paper, this area consists of the Arctic Ocean covered 
in ice and bound by land territory, in what is a massive area, spanning about 10 million square 
kilometers, in a semi-enclosed area with only two outlets: the Bering Strait leading into the 
northern Pacific Ocean and the Fram Strait leading into the northern Atlantic Ocean.
43
  
The Arctic’s environment, its most distinguishable characteristic, serves to demonstrate 
that problems of definition occur not in simple ways, but in rather complex forms, whether 
environmental, legal, philosophical, social, political, economical, and historical. Thus, when 
changes occur, they are pronounced. In this regard, the ACIA provides the seminal assessment in 
identifying changes in the Arctic environment. Published in 2004, the ACIA revealed significant 
increases in temperature contributing to decreases in snow cover and melting of sea ice. Based 
on trends, the ACIA estimated that the Arctic will warm by between 4-7 degrees Celsius (and up 
to 10 degrees Celsius) over the next one hundred years.
44
 Further increases in temperature and 
rises in sea-level are expected if an increase in carbon dioxide “continues unabated, with a 3°C 
increase in temperature for a ‘business-as-usual’ increase in greenhouse gases, and as much as a 
6°C increase” should carbon dioxide levels double.45 This would then contribute to a 
diminishment of snow cover which has already declined by 10% over the past thirty years and is 
estimated to decrease by a further 10-20% by 2070.
46
 A similar decline has occurred in sea ice, 
decreasing by about 8% over the last thirty years, and as much as 15-20% during the summer 
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months, as Arctic-wide average sea ice thickness has experienced reductions of 10-15%, and as 
much as 40%.
47
  
Similarly, by these estimates, sea ice duration in Canada can be expected to be at least ten 
days shorter by 2020, increasing to potentially a month shorter by 2080, even though ice cover 
currently remains land-locked for ten months of the year.
48
 The reasons for this are complex, as 
recent scientific evidence attests. The Arctic environment is strongly dictated by the earth-ocean-
atmosphere system which is managed by the sun’s radiation, and depends strongly on how much 
radiation reaches the Earth, where exactly, during which season, and the type of surface cover 
(water, land, ice).
49
 About thirty percent of this radiation is transported back into space by clouds 
for instance, while seventy percent is absorbed by the atmosphere and the surface of the earth. 
This surface radiation is “returned to the atmosphere through convection and longwave radiation, 
which is absorbed by clouds and greenhouse gases,” that is, a layer of gases (carbon dioxide, 
water vapour, methane to name a few) that trap heat and reflect some longwave radiation back 
down to the surface of the earth.
50
 In turn, this layer reflects radiation back down from the 
atmosphere that should have been escaping into space, warming the surface of the Earth. 
This process is essential to atmospheric and oceanic energy circulation, particularly from 
the mid-latitudes to the high latitudes because “atmospheric circulation in mid-latitudes 
transports energy poleward via transient disturbances (cyclones and anticyclones)…to zonal 
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(east-west) flow, including storm systems”.51 The atmosphere “also influences the ocean through 
winds that alter surface currents, as well as through both evaporation and precipitation that alter 
temperature and salinity,” both important features in a changing Arctic climate.52 It is a 
significant region in this regard because, in combination with the Antarctic region, the Arctic sets 
up the “large-scale circulation patterns and teleconnections that make our planet habitable”.53  
The Arctic Report Card, 2011, issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration similarly “considers a wide range of environmental observations throughout the 
Arctic” on an annual basis and recently concluded its 2011 study.54 This report indicated that 
“there are now a significant number of years of data to indicate a shift in the Arctic Ocean 
system since 2006,” characterized most significantly by a decline in the extent of summer sea ice 
cover and thickness, increases in ocean temperature further north in the ocean, and tied to these, 
warmer land temperatures in coastal regions leading to increases in tundra vegetation.
55
 
In terms of Arctic temperatures, the report noted that 2011 exhibited “area-wide positive 
temperature anomalies” indicating continued increases in temperature, where the “past six years 
have been the warmest such period in the instrumental record for the region poleward of 
60°N”.56 However, an important indicator of change used in the report is called “Arctic 
Amplification” noting that “the Arctic is warming faster than more southerly latitudes and that 
temperature increases will be Arctic-wide” as “twelve-month average near-surface air 
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temperature anomalies for October 2010 through September 2011 are above 1.5°C for most of 
the Arctic Ocean area”.57 The reasons for this are varied, and while local loss of sea ice and 
terrestrial snow cover is the primary cause for the increase, a less noted reason is the process of 
“poleward movement of heat and moisture from mid-latitudes as part of the required overall 
global heat transport from equatorial regions to the polar regions” which, combined with the 
other factors, lead to some warming.
58
 This is a unique system where multiple interacting 
changes lead to dramatic results. Surface atmospheric temperatures alter the Arctic environment 
in a number of ways, leading to a decrease in multi-year sea ice and glacial mass, where it is then 
nearly impossible to return to previous conditions. Thus, a combination of “gradual global 
warming, warm anomalies in internal climate variability in individual years, and impacts from 
multiple feedback processes,” lead to change.59 
Some of these changes have been observed by three Inuvialuit communities in the 
Mackenzie Delta, including the Tuktoyaktuk, Aklavik, and Inuvik. In particular, the Tuktoyaktuk 
noticed considerable changes in the unpredictability of weather including thunderstorms, less 
snowfall in the winter, longer, warmer summers, and a considerable amount of erosion that the 
other two had not also seen, losing land near the ocean.
60
 They also saw an increasing 
disappearance of permafrost, lower lakes and increasing algae, and a decrease in the quality of 
food including skinnier fish, new migration routes for birds and fish, and new wildlife and plant 
species they had not seen before.
61
 The Aklavik and the Inuvik saw many of the similar changes 
as the Tuktoyaktuk had. The Aklavik specifically saw much more of a change in water quality 
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and water levels and in the changing of the seasons, while the Inuvik saw much more dramatic 
changes in the unpredictability of the weather and in the different condition of wildlife, plants, 
fish, and insects.
62
  
However, what all three had in common consistently was the observation that sea and 
lake ice were undergoing changes. They saw an increasing loss of ice earlier in the spring and 
along the shores of rivers, noticing that the ice breaking was not as loud as it usually was.
63
 Sea 
ice, and its extent, plays a pivotal role in a number of ecological and biological processes in the 
Arctic, most notably as part of the mechanisms that reflect sunlight back into the ozone and for 
mammal feeding processes (polar bears for instance). However, during the decade from 2001 to 
2011, the extent and thickness of sea ice has been decreasing as the upper ocean gets warmer and 
fresher.
64
 Part of the reason is what is called an anticyclonic or clockwise wind-driven circulation 
regime that moves clouds and thus temperature in the region. For fourteen years up to 2011, this 
anticyclonic wind pattern system has been dominant, whereas the years from 1948-1996 saw a 
much more typical 5-8 year pattern of circulation shifting between cyclonic and anticylconic 
systems.
65
  
As the pattern has been mostly anticyclonic recently, and combined with warm air 
temperatures, “the summer extent of the sea ice cover has been at least 15-20% below the 1979-
2000 average”.66 Sea ice extent and thickness are important markers in analyzing effects on the 
Arctic region, particularly at two times during the year: at the end of the summer season in 
September when ice is at its most minimal point and at the end of the winter season in March, 
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when ice is at its most maximal extent.
67
 According to the NOAA, in September 2011, sea ice 
extent reached its second lowest minimum at 4.33 million square kilometers, just slightly greater 
(0.16 million square kilometers more) than the previously lowest minimum in 2007, and 31% 
smaller than the entire 1979-2000 average, or 2.08 million square kilometers smaller (see Figure 
1).
68
 Also notable is the fact that declines in sea ice extent are greatest from August to October 
with an increase in inter-annual variability during these months for the decade beginning in 2001 
to 2011.
69
 NOAA reports a similar trend concerning maximum ice extent was measured in 
March 2011. Moreover, maximum sea ice extent reached 14.64 million square kilometers in 
2011; a roughly 7.7% decrease from the previous average of 15.86 million square kilometers (see 
Figure 1).
70
  
 
Figure 1: Left, Arctic sea ice extent in March 2011.
71
 Right, Arctic sea ice extent in 
September 2011.
72
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These figures represent the declining trend of sea ice, which alters borders in the region, 
identified most cogently by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) which isolated a 
number of key changes. Estimates by the ACIA suggest the area could experience an increase in 
temperature of up to 10 degrees Celsius over the next one hundred years.
73
 Similarly, snow cover 
over the past thirty years has decreased by about 10%,
74
 with declines in sea ice extent and 
Arctic-wide average sea ice thickness reduced by about 10-15%, and as much as 40% in some 
areas.
75
  
The comparison of such changes during the two measurement periods of 1979-2000 and 
2001-2011 and the differences noted in sea ice extent between them indicate that a significant 
shift has occurred and this shift is indicative of a “new regime of reduced sea ice” in the Arctic 
region.
76
 These decreases, with some local variability, are becoming much more common.
77
 Ice 
extent is distributed differently around the Arctic however, with a “pronounced retreat of ice 
around the periphery of the Arctic Basin and ice loss in the Canadian Archipelago,” most notably 
since 1980. Although this is the case, the central Arctic (northeast Greenland and the northern 
edge of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago) still contains ice, while ice north of Alaska consists of 
“a mixture of dispersed floes of first-year and multiyear ice amid considerable amounts of open 
water”.78  
As such, there is some variation, though a regime of reduced sea ice is much more 
prevalent now compared to previous years where ice was still compact and consolidated by the 
end of the summer. The age of the ice plays a role too, since older ice is usually thicker and more 
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resilient to change than younger ice. This is observable through satellite observations and the 
NOAA has determined that older ice reached a record minimum in the summer of 2011, although 
there was an increase in younger ice, suggesting that the ice mass has increased slightly in size 
but not in thickness or gained a lasting quality.
79
 
Barber et. al., in analyzing perennial pack ice in the southern Beaufort Sea in the summer 
of 2009, had “observed a much different sea icescape in the southern Beaufort Sea than 
anticipated, based on remotely sensed products”.80 Their testing of multi-year and thick first-year 
sea ice in the deeper waters of the Canadian Basin determined that “heavily decayed, very small 
remnant multi-year and first-year floes” were “interspersed with new ice between floes, in melt 
ponds, thaw holes and growing over…older ice,” and containing about 25 per cent open water, 
“predominantly distributed between floes or in thaw holes connected to the ocean below”.81 Such 
an observation was witnessed in the Beaufort Sea ice pack which spans about 100 km to the west 
of Banks Island, where an opening of a flaw lead was seen, implying a thinning, and more 
mobile ice pack over the Arctic Ocean.
82
  
Fortier and Cochran echo this sentiment as scientists part of the Canadian Arctic Shelf 
Exchange Study (CASES) which was conducted from September 2002 to September 2004 and 
documented “the potential impacts of a shift in sea ice regime on the ecosystem of the 
Mackenzie Shelf in the southeastern Beaufort Sea.
83
 They also demonstrate that “among the 
numerous consequences of a warmer Arctic, the ongoing reduction of Arctic sea ice will have 
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major environmental impacts” particularly because of its changing nature.84 They refer to this sea 
ice as a “highly dynamic and thermodynamic skin of ice” that effectively “dictates air-sea 
exchanges, biological productivity and carbon fluxes over 15 million square kilometers of 
ocean”.85 Thus, its reduction along the Mackenzie Shelf, and other Arctic shelves, can potentially 
alter “biogeochemical fluxes on Arctic shelves, therefore affecting the export of carbon…to the 
food webs, and to the deep basins where it can be sequestered”.86 Additionally, they note that 
this is still not completely understood and further assessment of the processes “linking sea ice to 
freshwater, biological productivity, and carbon cycling” is necessary so that the “role of a 
seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean as a future sink or source of atmospheric carbon dioxide”.87 
Similarly, the anticylconic wind-driven circulation regime mentioned earlier has an effect 
on ocean temperature and salinity as much as increases in atmospheric temperature do.
88
 In 
particular, in August 2011 sea surface temperatures in the western Arctic Ocean just northwest of 
Canada and Alaska were unusually warm, and such “interannual variations in sea surface 
temperature anomalies reflect differences in the pace of sea ice retreat…as well as changing 
advection of warm ocean currents from the south”.89 Solar radiation also plays a role in this, as it 
“has penetrated more easily into the upper ocean under thinning and retreating ice cover to create 
warm near-surface temperature maxima,” which has had a strong effect in the Canadian Basin, 
with warmer temperatures reaching 30 meters in depth “because of increased downwelling in the 
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convergent Beaufort Gyre during recent strongly-anticyclonic years…while surface mixing is 
decreasing as stratification increases”.90 
In this regard, the Beaufort Gyre, a rotating ocean current driven by wind systems, “is a 
large ocean circulation feature that plays a significant role in regulating variability in the Arctic 
climate”.91 As such, its anticyclonic (clockwise) rotation “promotes sea ice convergence, higher 
ice concentrations, and increased ice ridging,” although during the summer this can reverse to a 
cyclonic rotation due to lower sea level pressure around the Beaufort Sea.
92
 Consequently, its 
influence on sea ice motion depends on sea ice extent and strength of circulation. This is weakest 
in April when sea ice extent is predominantly at its maximum extent, and strongest in the late 
summer when ice extent is at its minimum.
93
  It is also an important area for measurement 
because it “is the largest reservoir of freshwater in the Arctic Ocean,” which gained freshwater 
from 2003-2010, adding approximately 25% or more than 5000 km3.
94
 It is an area that had 
never been explored until the late 1920s due to its harsh climate, darkness, and thick drifting sea 
ice at the time, while simultaneously “comprising a set of specific atmospheric, sea ice, and 
oceanic conditions that have significant influence on the Arctic climate”.95 
The first scientific observations of the Gyre were made in April and May of 1941 by 
Soviet scientists, landing on sea ice, making meteorological calculations and measuring ocean 
depth.
96
 These early results “showed the presence of warm waters of Atlantic origin at 500 
meters depth, with temperatures at least two times lower than the Makarov and Nansen basins of 
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the Arctic Ocean”.97 In expeditions in 1953, scientists found that the deep water in the Beaufort 
Sea was warmer by 0.35°C than in the ocean north of Siberia.
98
 The original explanation for this 
was a submarine ridge separating the deepest water of the sea from the basin, but this 
temperature difference was actually caused by the anticyclonic motion of the gyre.  
Numerous expeditions have been held since. Namely, some of the most recent and 
comprehensive work was done in 2003 as the Beaufort Gyre Exploration Project. It was begun to 
test salinity minimums at the centre of the gyre specifically, indicating that salinity levels, which 
extend from the surface to about 400 meters depth, show that the Canada Basin contains about 
45,000 km3 of freshwater.
99
 Studies continued as part of this research indicated that the sea ice 
and its movement “as an intermediate link between the atmosphere and ocean and a product of 
interactions between the two is responsible for regulating momentum and heat transfer between 
the atmosphere and ocean”.100 It does this by “accumulating and releasing freshwater or salt 
during the melting-freezing cycle” and moving the freshwater elsewhere “by incorporating first-
year ice from the marginal seas into the convergent Beaufort Gyre circulation”.101 In turn, this 
process of combining different types of water, and different states of water, transforms it into 
ridged and thick multiyear ice.
102
 This helps to keep the previous year’s conditions available as a 
record for scientific analysis, but more importantly, it protects “the ocean from overcooling or 
overheating, both of which are extremely important for nutrient dynamics”.103  
Freshwater is also an important determinant in contemplating the effects a changing 
climate is having on a particular region. Freshwater in the Beaufort Gyre increased from 2004 to 
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2008, and has remained at a higher than previous level ever since.
104
 In scientific terms, this has 
created a deeper nutricline and subsurface chlorophyll maximum, increasing the depth of the 
upper halocline in the interior Canadian basin.
105
 This creates the conditions necessary for 
changes to biological production due to stresses on the environment that were not previously 
there.  
In turn, this leads to “a reduction of overall nitrate fluxes into the mixed layer, a condition 
that limits new biological production and favours smaller organisms at the base of the food web,” 
while a much “deeper halocline further removes the nutricline and chlorophyll maximum from 
sunlight increasing the importance of light limitation”.106 As such, water currents which carry 
certain nutrients to the area and from the area are also affected, as is the transport of such 
nutrients. One such current, an eddy, or water current which rotates in the opposite direction of 
the pervasive current, becomes more prevalent. These are important because they carry 
“ammonium from the shelf to the (Canadian) basin to sustain a higher biomass of 
picophytoplankton within the eddy,” which serves the needs at the base of the food web but is 
potentially harmful to others above them in the food web.
107
 This transport is central “to 
biological production as the nutricline is now deeper and those nutrients less available”.108 
Also notable is the fact that biological productivity could be increased further in the 
Arctic Ocean outside the Beaufort Gyre due to the “nutrient supply from the shelves and greater 
light penetration for photosynthesis caused by sea ice loss,” especially along the Canadian and 
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Alaskan Beaufort shelves.
109
 The waters along these continental shelves can be “expected to 
become more productive because of increased exposure to upwelling favourable wind enhanced 
by reduced ice extent and a more mobile ice pack that is more responsive to wind forcing,” 
creating more open water and necessary conditions for phytoplankton production, for instance, 
although this phenomena is more pervasive in the Kara Sea.
110
  
Continental shelves are very sensitive to environmental changes because this is where 
river discharges and decay during melting periods occur and affect water and nutrient 
circulation.
111
 Upwelling and downwelling are important phenomena in this regard, particularly 
in the Arctic environment of the Beaufort Sea because these oceanic motions help sustain the 
ecosystem. During longer ice-free seasons, a greater opportunity for upwelling exists, especially 
with increasing warming and salinity from Pacific waters along the surface, “resulting in 
enhanced melt and nutrient supply for production along the continental shelves”.112 Upwelling 
occurs when a wind current called the Ekman transport gathers surface water along the coast, 
moves it away from the coast, and replaces it with deeper water, cycling nutrients and carbon 
dioxide found in the deep water.
113
 Downwelling is a similar process, although the Ekman 
transport drives surface water toward the coast where it gathers and sinks.
114
 It is an important 
process in an Arctic marine ecosystem dependent on seasonal sea ice accumulation along the 
Beaufort Sea and its adjoining coastline. Downwelling ensures that oxygen does not sustain 
decomposition on the surface while upwelling allows for nutrients deeper in the ocean to be fed 
throughout the Arctic ecosystem. 
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In a study of these currents, Yang examined the “seasonal and interannual to decadal 
variability of oceanic downwelling in the Beaufort Sea,” and determined that surface winds are 
the “primary driver for (downwelling) variability in the upper Arctic Ocean and sea ice”.115 This 
is influenced by “a high sea level pressure centre that emerges in the fall and diminishes in the 
summer” as the most downwelling occurs from fall to spring in the interior Beaufort Sea, and 
upwelling along the Alaskan and Canadian coasts, due to the anticylconic nature of winds which 
force sea ice.
116
  
Yang notes however that these currents and their motions intensified from 1979 to 2006, 
hypothesizing that a “change in ice dynamics (thinner and less areal coverage) was responsible 
for the change in ice velocity” and thus an intensification in downwelling.117 Yang examined 
these variations in the Beaufort Sea during three periods: from 1979-1986, 1988-1994, and 1996-
2004. The study area demonstrated that “the downwelling was weak in both spring (April-June) 
and summer (July-September) in all three periods” while during winter (January-March) 
downwelling “was stronger than that in summer and spring in all periods”.118 While these 
conclusions were not entirely different than previous findings “it is noted that the downwelling in 
the Beaufort Sea had strengthened considerably over these three periods” as “the maximum 
downwelling rate in the Beaufort Sea increased from about 5cm/d in 1979-1986 to more than 
10cm/d in 1996-2004,” also strengthening the upwelling current along both the Alaskan and 
Canadian coastlines.
119
  
                                               
115 J. Yang, “Seasonal and interannual variability of downwelling in the Beaufort Sea,” Journal of Geophysical 
Research 114 (2009): at 1. 
116 Ibid., at 1. 
117 Ibid., at 1. 
118 Ibid., at 8. 
119 Ibid., at 8. 
30 
 
This meant that the “strongest downwelling and largest interannual changes occurred in 
the fall between October and December” which was different than previously observed.120 Yang 
determined that this strengthening and variability was actually dictated by winter variability. 
Tests were conducted that sought to determine whether sea ice was responsible for the 
difference. The seasonal variability of the sea ice was plotted over the three periods and the 
results were consistent with previous results, with “a steady decline of summer sea ice coverage 
over the Arctic basin” in the summer months (June to August).121 During this time surface winds 
and ice velocity are usually weaker than other months and thus downwelling is at its minimum in 
the Beaufort Sea as ice coverage is also at its minimum.  
Conversely, from October to December the Beaufort Sea is mostly covered by sea ice 
with little difference in downwelling. This led Yang to conclude that while “the variability of sea 
ice concentration was not directly responsible for the large change of oceanic downwelling in the 
Beaufort Sea,” the “ice concentration, however, does affect the response of the ice velocity to 
wind stress forcing”.122 Thus, the movement of the ice contributes to increased downwelling in 
the Beaufort Sea and upwelling along the Alaskan and Canadian coasts. Sea ice only moves 
when unfrozen, and so it can be concluded that such an alteration is part of the effect of climate 
change, as ice melts and contributes to further movement.  
These studies reflect the changing nature of the Arctic environment but only make brief 
reference to the causes of such change. Perhaps one of the most dangerous to the Arctic 
environment and more generally as well are POPs (persistent organic pollutants), which include 
pesticides like dieldrin and toxaphene, industrial compounds like polychlorinated biphenyls 
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(PCBs), and combustion by-products like dioxins and furans.
123
 Problematically, most of these 
are not even used in the Arctic, travelling from more southern locales, through some of the 
atmospheric and ocean circulation patterns already mentioned. Further, these chemicals accrue in 
the fatty tissue of animals and passing from the bottom of the food chain to the top through 
predation, affecting immune function, reproduction, and development.
124
  
A similar pattern is observed with heavy metals, with the most potentially toxic being 
mercury, cadmium and lead, posing a risk not only to animals, but humans as well. Uses of these 
heavy metals are still high, with 2000 tons of mercury emitted annually on a global level through 
coal-burning plants, waste incineration, and refining operations mainly, with another 4000 tons 
released naturally.
125
 Cadmium is also still prevalent, reaching 7600 tons a year from very 
similar sources to mercury, with lead reaching over 300,000 tons annually from leaded gasoline 
mostly.
126
  
Consequently, the Arctic environment is changing in ways that have not been previously 
witnessed. A significant amount of research has been conducted in the area to this point, 
especially in the Beaufort Sea area, as specific weather patterns and morphological conditions 
render the sea somewhat unique in the Arctic Ocean. This research has led to increased attention 
on the Beaufort Sea, contributing toward a much more comprehensive consideration of the 
potential effects a changing climate is having on the area. Sea ice reductions, decreases in sea ice 
thickness of multi-year ice, increases in temperature, permafrost instability, affects on biological 
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productivity, and alterations to ocean currents in the area are specific changes occurring in the 
Beaufort Sea. Given these recent transformations, alterations to the Arctic environment will 
continue and have an effect on the relationships of coastal nations, with implications for 
sovereignty and for resource development. 
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Chapter Three: The Development of Sea Law 
International law is universal. It is a body of law which applies to all states regardless of 
their specific and distinctive cultures, belief systems and political organizations. It is a 
common set of doctrines which all states, whether Europe or Latin America, Africa or Asia, 
use to regulate relations with each other…it is today hard to conceive of an international 
law which is not universal. And yet, the universality of international law is a relatively 
recent development.127 
 
If the Beaufort Sea is not immune to the effects of climate change, it is similarly not 
immune to the effects of changes in international law. As melting sea ice in particular prompts a 
redrawing of borders, law has to change to adapt to these circumstances. However, the law of the 
sea has a rich history and particularly so more recently concerning the Beaufort Sea, containing 
the origins of the dispute within its changing legal norms, principles, and laws. This chapter will 
detail the development of the international law of the sea to provide an analysis of past legal 
norms and concepts that have had an effect on current legal norms and concepts around the law 
of the sea. These changes have had, and continue to have, an impact on Arctic governance and 
the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute, fomenting a governance regime of the circumpolar 
north while developing international maritime law that reflects current state behaviour.  
The Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute is the product of two nations interpreting 
legal documents in conflicting ways and according to different principles because of a particular 
historical record. The laws both nations have used to interpret their claims have been changed 
over time and so each nation’s view on the subject differs. Today, international law concerning 
the oceans is primarily governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the 
UNCLOS) which seeks to codify maritime delimitations, among other things. The UNCLOS 
represents the culmination of a long history of international law relating to the oceans, whose 
basis is guided by an evolution of principles that govern activity in this area. When finalized in 
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1982, the UNCLOS contained 320 articles and 9 annexes, and thus became a modern legal order 
for the oceans, codifying borders from land out to sea.
128
 It consists of “the international legal 
regime governing the division of ocean space, sovereign rights over ocean resources, protection 
of the marine environment and the conduct of activities in and under the Arctic Ocean.”129 In 
effect, it seeks to guarantee “the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection, 
and preservation of the marine environment”.130 
However, it was a long process to get to this point, with each change in laws reflected in 
succeeding laws. In this regard, international law relating to the seas can be dated back to Roman 
law and the Laws of the Twelve Tables in 415 BCE.
131
 Maritime navigation in this period 
revolved around a number of guiding principles: mare liberum, which referred to “high seas 
open to all nations,” and mare clausum, referring to a “closed sea under the authority of adjacent 
nations”.132 A comparable provision was developed in ancient Norway in taking the median 
distance between marine boundaries and declaring this area a mare nostrum or “our seas” so that 
sea routes between Greenland, Norway, and Russia, could be protected.
133
 As such, international 
law was fairly simplistic at the time, with clear delineations enforced by naval means, for the 
purposes of war.
134
 Moreover, similar processes continued to be undertaken into the Age of 
Exploration in efforts to legitimize European expansion. In particular, the Treaty of Tordesillas, 
1494, after Columbus sailed across the Atlantic and a Papal Bull issued by Pole Alexander VI, 
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set forth European expansion into the West by drawing a line “on a meridian of longitude 
through Brazil effectively allocating the then world into an area of Portuguese expansion to the 
east and Spanish expansion to the west”.135 
Anghie explains that the primitive origins of modern international law can be found in the 
work of Francisco de Vitoria, a sixteenth-century Spanish theologian and jurist focusing on the 
social and cultural practices of his native Spain and its interaction with the Indians they 
colonized.
136
 Vitoria’s jurisprudence took existing doctrines of the time and invented new ones to 
“deal with the novel problem of the Indians”.137 For Anghie, “international law such as it existed 
in Vitoria’s time did not precede and thereby effortlessly resolve the problem of Spanish-Indian 
relations,” but was rather “created out of the unique issues generated by the encounter between 
the Spanish and the Indians”.138  
While Anghie’s examination concerns the origins of international law and the colonial 
experience, and thus the interaction between international law and colonialism, he raises an 
important problem in international law, that is, how order is created between sovereign states.
139
 
During Vitoria’s time, this was not a problem of order among sovereign states but rather of 
identifying who is sovereign and what powers they possess by identifying their customs and 
practices. The problem was not of order but of “creating a system of law to account for relations 
between societies which he understood to belong to two very different cultural orders, each with 
its own ideas of propriety and governance”.140 Sovereignty, or “the complex of rules deciding 
what entities are sovereign, and the powers and limits of sovereignty,” emerged as a doctrine 
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through Vitoria’s account of how to address cultural differences.141 This negated the older 
version of medieval law focused on the Pope’s universal authority and his exercise of such 
authority in favour of a more secularized version of international law and notions of natural law 
which formed the basis of succeeding laws of the sea when applied to maritime matters.  
As such, Papal authority was the determinant of the rule of the sovereign under the 
traditional framework that relied on divine law. In this way Pope Alexander VI was able to issue 
the Papal Bull mentioned earlier that divided the entire world among Spain and Portugal, both 
strong maritime nations at the time. Conversely, Vitoria’s system of international law replaced 
divine law with natural law and secular sovereign rule. This allowed Vitoria to separate 
ownership and property from divine law and so the “Indians cannot be deprived of their lands 
merely by virtue of their status as unbelievers or heretics”.142 He suggested that such issues 
should be decided under secular law for this reason, as “whatever the punishments awaiting them 
in their after-life, unbelievers such as Indians were not deprived of their property in the mundane 
realm merely by virtue of that status”.143 Ironically, Vitoria studied Biblical incidents where this 
might be the case to come to this conclusion, effectively undermining Papal authority with the 
same instrument that ruled it. 
For Anghie, Vitoria rejects universal Papal authority empowering sovereigns to “pursue 
military action against heathens and infidels” because they belong to two different worldviews, 
thus neither has jurisdiction over the other.
144
 Both the Spanish and the Indians have their own 
political systems and governance structures. This meant they possessed reason that gave them the 
ability to create institutions and determine moral questions, and could thus be subject to jus 
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gentium. It is an application of universal natural law ascertained by the use of reason, solving the 
problem of jurisdiction for the Spanish, naturalizing and legitimating Spanish incursion because 
both parties are created as equal sovereigns under law, sanctioning their activity as rational 
action amongst equally rational partners.
145
 Natural law is thus an agglomeration of 
transcendental principles identified through the use of reason.
146
 Here, “all human activity was 
bound by an overarching morality” binding sovereign states.147 In a sense, it comes from a 
“divine authority or from basic human characteristics”.148  
Effectively, natural law was a pragmatic attempt to agglomerate transcendental principles 
identified through the use of reason.
149
 It sought to legitimize certain actions beneficial to the 
law-making party by creating a common framework for them to construct a subject within the 
reach of law but simultaneously outside its protection, justifying any action deemed necessary. It 
was a development that sought to co-opt resistance by defining rules within a framework that did 
not allow for opposing views. In effect, the rules were created for the benefit of the rulers on the 
basis that this was how it was to be, as evidenced by the Papal Bull above. 
Consequently, the benefit of instituting natural law is a resolution of the problem of 
jurisdiction because the “gap between the two cultures now ceases to exist in that a common 
framework by which both Spanish and Indian behavior may be assessed is established”.150 This 
framework idealized Spanish culture and practice while universalizing the two, naturalizing the 
practice as if it were existent in a secular state of nature.
151
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Both parties were able to participate in such a system as equals, particularly in trade and 
exchange, as they would attempt to meet “the other’s material lack and possessing, implicitly, 
the autonomy to decide what is of value to them”.152 Both can thus be portrayed as independent 
actors in what appears to be an equal, fair, and reciprocal process. However, it was also a system 
that legitimated Spanish influence in the Indian society by authorizing a specific economic and 
political dependency by creating a common framework for them to operate in void of cultural 
difference, constructing the Indian within the reach of law and yet outside its protection, 
justifying violence leading to conversion. Any “Indian attempt to resist Spanish penetration 
would amount to an act of war which would justify Spanish retaliation”.153 As such, a very 
specific change occurred in the thinking and practice of international law. A secularized version 
of international law substituted divine law in the relationship between the Spanish and the 
Indians, under the principle of jus gentium. Any attempt to resist was not seen as violation of 
universal Papal authority under the auspices of a divine law but rather a universalized natural law 
administered by a sovereign authority. Anghie surmises here that the question of who the 
sovereign is and what constitutes sovereign power in the “complex political systems of 
Renaissance Europe” are difficult questions to answer.154  
However, clear distinctions are made between the Spanish and the Indians and their roles 
under jus gentium, particularly noting that the sovereign cannot be an Indian, and that they “exist 
within the Vitorian framework only as violators of the law”.155 In this sense, sovereignty under 
jus gentium exists as a dividing mechanism amongst equal partners to establish a framework that 
consolidates a relationship of power thus rendering them unequal. The Indian or conquered 
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people, are devoid of sovereignty once having gained it and should resistance exist, it can be 
quelled because they have been subscribed to universal natural law. A violation of universal 
natural law must be controlled; otherwise this structure cannot be sustained. 
Anghie makes a very important conclusion suggesting that “the conventional view that 
sovereignty doctrine was developed in the West and then transferred to the non-European world 
is, in important respects, misleading”.156 Astutely, he suggests that the “sovereignty doctrine 
acquired its character through the colonial encounter,” originating most cogently in a set of 
jurisprudence emanating from Spanish practices that became universally binding in an idealized 
form.
157
  
Inevitably, how order is created and maintained amongst sovereign states rests in the 
colonial world, and not just the version espousing the imperial tendencies of European nations at 
the time. Anghie demonstrates this by focusing on the sovereign Spanish encounter with the non-
sovereign Indian, and how it was determined that the Indian was non-sovereign. He notes that 
this was accomplished by accepting that the colonial world was not sovereign, which allowed the 
framework to “create for itself, and present as inevitable and natural, the grand redeeming project 
of bringing the marginalized into the realm of sovereignty, civilizing the uncivilized, and 
developing the juridical techniques and institutions necessary for this great mission”.158 It 
became a manipulation of a particular set of circumstances and prevailing attitudes to fit a 
specific necessity at the time, facilitating economic exploitation of a non-European territory 
while circumventing rules of state responsibility. It is a behavior paralleled today during the 
Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute. 
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The basis for international law in its recent incarnation thus resides in a colonial history. 
It was not until the nineteenth century reconstruction of the system through a focus on positivism 
that the modern system took its more recognizable, and universalized form. Positive law has as 
its locus the sovereign state, which is the foundation of the legal system.
159
 This meant that there 
was no overarching natural law or some higher morality governing legal function, but that the 
state was the highest authority, bound to that which it agreed to, emphasizing the behavior of 
states and institutions in the laws they create.
160
 As such, law comes from a central authority and 
through a formal process.
161
 Thus, something like a treaty for instance was an expression of 
sovereign will, suggesting consent to be bound, and these, in combination with customary law, 
governed international behavior.
162
 By this logic only European law of the nineteenth century 
could create international law, and thus non-Europeans were excluded from the law-making 
process, being instead the “exclusive preserve of European states, as a result of which the former 
(non-Europeans) were deprived of membership and the ability to assert any rights cognizable as 
legal”.163  
The precipitating impetus toward positive law was the push of imperial nations 
organizing themselves in their colonial empires, consisting of rules “which had been agreed upon 
by sovereign states, either explicitly or implicitly, as regulating relations between them”.164 
Where naturalist jurists like Grotius argued that “reason revealed a set of rules which governed 
relations between nations,” having elements of a foundation for legal positivism, it still relied on 
transcendental principles founded while in the state of nature in a distant past. Positive law 
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changed this entirely and represented an evolution in the law rejecting previous divine law and 
natural law where state activity was governed by a higher morality. Instead, “rules of 
international law were to be discovered not by speculative inquiries into the nature of justice or 
teleology, but by a careful study of the actual behavior of states and institutions and laws which 
they created”.165  
A contradiction exists in this positive law because international law, as a scientific 
discipline by this time, only existed as such by affirming customary law, which governs 
primitive societies in the first place.
166
 International law disassociates from the primitive version 
by becoming authoritative, and in this period was a “far more anxiety-driven process of naming 
the unfamiliar, asserting its alien nature, and attempting to reduce and subordinate it”.167 Thus, 
much like the natural law of Vitoria, positive law demarcated the “exclusive sphere occupied by 
European states,” relying on the premise of positivist sovereignty that civilized states were 
sovereign and uncivilized were not, though relying more on formal process than 
transcendentalism.
168
 It reaffirms that unequal relations are reinforced through political structures 
like the law, especially with Europeans dealing with non-European societies that were beyond 
the scope of law, except when the expansion of territory or trade was concerned.
169
 Sovereignty 
for the European world represented an assertion of power and authority while for the non-
European world it was a mechanism of suppression.
170
 Such a legacy is important because of the 
lasting effect it has had on the legal system today. The contemporary system is characterized by 
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the United Nations, formerly the League of Nations, and its legal mechanisms including the 
UNCLOS and international environmental law.  
Due to these colonial origins, the regime originally established by the League of Nations 
first after the annexation of German and Ottoman territories after World War I (called the 
Mandate System), sought to be neither positivist nor naturalist. Conquest and exploration were 
no longer effective for international law, so this system was devised to promote self-government 
and independent states, involving “nothing less than the creation of the social, political, and 
economic conditions thought necessary to support a functioning nation-state”.171 As a forerunner 
to the United Nations, the League of Nations and the Mandate System provided for the evolution 
in the role, place, and scope of international law. It required codification of international law and 
the creation of an institution with the capacity to address this need.  
The League of Nations and the Mandate System created the basis for organizing a 
community of states seeking a common goal and the maintenance of such cooperative action in 
the attempt to restrain aggressive activity. While imperfect, and lacking enforcement even today, 
it did provide for the evolution of international law not through coercive means, but through the 
persuasion of the advantages of the pursuit of common goals through cooperative means.  
Conversely, the Mandate System, Anghie suggests, “transferred only sovereignty to 
mandate peoples, not the powers associated with ‘government’ in the form of control over the 
political economy”.172 In this sense, economic power is still prone to external force and this type 
of system indeed enhanced the network of economic relationships connecting the mandated 
territory to the international economy, undermining to a degree the interests of the people. 
However, it is also a system that enabled a flexible and comprehensive legal system supported by 
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an administrative network comprising norms, standards, and treaty provisions. Sovereignty under 
international law provides the necessary tool to protect and further a nation’s interests in this 
way, particularly given shared economic interests, though it does have a historicity rooted in 
unequal relations.  
In a similar way to Vitoria’s creation of a framework that defended Spanish colonial 
interests, Hugo Grotius, building on similar natural law principles, wrote the de Mare Liberum, 
1609. This was a preliminary treatise on maritime navigation suggesting that the ocean cannot be 
delineated by any particular nations, that it is “an ocean unbridled by national claims, in which 
the mercantile nations had unrestricted rights of navigation and passage”.173 In defending Dutch 
trade amidst Portuguese competition, Grotius reasoned that the oceans were common to all, void 
of ownership or property relations and this became the dominant doctrine at the time.
174
 
The Grotian view of freedom of the seas, based on natural law, remained until the 
nineteenth century, when legal positivism arose, and when the increased militarization of naval 
capacities and their subsequent entrance into the coastal waters of warring states revealed a 
necessity to develop an amendment to the original rule. This led to a distinct right to control 
coastal waters in what was called the territorial sea, later adopted into the UNCLOS.
175
  
Accordingly, constitutive of the time period and the need for the development of a 
flexible system that could respond to modernization and new demands on ocean and sea space, 
the territorial sea became the area “over which the adjacent coastal state exercised jurisdiction 
and control, principally for the purposes of security, but also in relation to resources that may 
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have been found close to the coast such as fisheries”.176 This was an important development 
toward a modern law of the sea (though difficult to enforce unless a naval power), as the 
necessity developed for an accommodation of “emerging state practice within the dominant 
paradigm of the law of the sea which remained the freedom of the seas”.177 Much like the 
development of international law and its concern with sovereignty, the international law of the 
sea developed in stages, culminating in the UNCLOS, respecting both the law of the sea and the 
doctrine of state sovereignty. It has grown simultaneously with other mechanisms of governance, 
including treaties, practices and policies, to develop a governance regime that intersects with 
scientific research, environmental protection, and other areas of international law.  
The UNCLOS attempts to delineate a structure by which maritime nations are able to 
equitably and peacefully manage resources, industry, and the environment and it does so by 
providing an international legal framework for delimiting a coastal state’s boundaries. This 
framework is based on a series of different parameters for delimiting a coastal state’s waters. 
Conversely, this framework also prescribes the limits of navigability and other actions outside 
nations may take in a coastal state’s waters. For example, the immediate part of the Arctic Ocean 
in this case that is closest to Canada and out to 12 nautical miles (nm) is Canada’s territorial sea 
over which it has complete sovereign status, enabling Canada to enforce most laws.
178
  
Similarly, the next boundary is what is referred to as a contiguous zone. This is a 
boundary extending up to 24 nm from the coastline and allows for Canada, as the coastal state, to 
continue to enforce laws in pollution, taxation, custom, and immigration.
179
 Extending from this 
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boundary is what is called the exclusive economic zone that extends 200 nm from the coast, and 
gives the coastal state expropriation rights over natural resources.
180
 However, the same clauses 
that provide the framework for these boundaries also suggest that the exclusive economic zone 
can be extended to 350 nm from the coastline should the geomorphology of the seafloor meet 
specific conditions set out by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 
including the condition that the continental shelf must be part of the natural prolongation of the 
land territory.
181
  
 The process to come to these more modern standards began following the establishment 
of the League of Nations and the pursuit of common agreement amongst states through the 
codification of international legal mechanisms as positive law replaced natural law as the 
dominant legal framework. In terms of the sea, priority was given to the territorial sea and “the 
treatment of foreign vessels” which led to The Hague Codification Conference in 1930 at the 
behest of the League of Nations with 44 nations present.
182
 Although this conference did not lead 
to any binding commitment in the form of hard law, with states divided on the limits of the 
territorial sea and “especially its breadth and relationship with an adjacent contiguous zone,” in 
the proceeding years progress was made in the Convention Regarding the Regime of Straits in 
1936 concerning the regulation of navigation in the Black Sea straits.
183
  
This was the last significant discussion around an international law of the sea until 1945 
and the Truman Proclamation in which the United States declared that it would, by Presidential 
Proclamation No. 2667, “exercise jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the 
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subsoil and sea bed of the contiguous continental shelf,” an area of the seabed along the coastline 
that “extended out to the ocean as an effective undersea extension of the landmass”.184 This 
would allow the US to lay claim to natural resources located there without competition because 
the continental shelf would be seen as a natural extension of the coast. Rothwell and Stephens 
note that this was the “first substantive claim by a coastal state to a distinctive offshore resources 
zone, which was completely separate from the territorial sea”.185 This would be the precedent for 
further developments concerning the continental shelf later, and relevant presently to the Arctic. 
 Following this unilateral action was a body of jurisprudence relating to territorial waters. 
These quickly led to the establishment of the International Law Commission by the United 
Nations in 1949, which sought to codify and develop international law concerning the seas. In 
turn, discussions concluded with an agreement on draft articles and commentary in 1956, with 
the commentary in particular offering a foundation for the interpretation of certain articles by 
legal scholars and governments.  
This would then lead to the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 
1958 in Geneva and the introduction of four conventions addressing novel delimitations at the 
time. These included the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas, and the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, as well as a preliminary 
agreement on dispute resolution, nuclear tests, radioactive pollution, fisheries, and historic 
waters.
186
 It was a significant meeting in that 86 states were in attendance in a post-war climate 
essentially documenting efforts at peace-making through international legal mechanisms. 
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However, Cold War tensions brought to light important security questions surrounding military 
uses of the seas, navigation, and the right of landlocked states to ocean access.  
 This first UNCLOS was indeed a substantial agreement in addressing international 
concerns regarding maritime jurisdiction. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone effectively brought the territorial sea discussion into treaty form.
187
 Little was 
accomplished as to exact limits of the territorial sea at this time, though this Convention did 
discuss the contiguous zone as a limit up to 12 nm that exists for the enforcement of domestic 
laws (pollution, immigration).
188
  
Perhaps more importantly to Arctic developments later, as well as the developing nature 
and logic of international law, was the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Convention 
on the High Seas, reflective of the changing nature of technological development and state 
practice. Namely, in limiting continental shelf boundaries, a lack of definition regarding 
specificities gave developed states “a potentially greater capacity than other states to exploit the 
continental shelf seabed because of technological superiority” to a 200 nm limit and beyond, but 
with no real limit except to where boundaries with other nations meet.
189
 Rights to the shelf were 
classified as sovereign rights and included natural resources of the shelf, including non-living 
resources of the seabed. Rights to the high seas were similarly dealt with and included the seas 
excluding the territorial sea, which meant parts of the contiguous zone and continental shelf. As 
such, a basis was established in UNCLOS I as a “multilateral treaty framework” representing a 
“contemporary international law of the sea”.190  
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Some unresolved matters, chiefly those about the limits of the territorial sea and limits of 
a fishery, were further discussed two years later in a second conference, UNCLOS II. Under 
discussion was the limit of the territorial sea being 6 nm, favoured by some, and 12 nm, favoured 
by the rest. A solution was proposed by Canada and the United States where the territorial sea 
would be set at 6 nm, with the last six being a fishing zone.
191
 To proceed, a two-thirds support 
vote was necessary, and fell short by one vote, thus making no contribution to the previous 
conference or the international legal regime established by the first UNCLOS agreements. As 
state concerns revolve around jurisdiction of maritime limits, the basis was provided for the next 
conference held in 1973. 
Importantly, the beginnings of a regime for the deep seabed that carried over into the 
third UNCLOS conference were established. Technological developments were making it easier 
to explore the resource potential of the seabed and developing states, relying on their natural 
resources for their national incomes were “particularly concerned that the free exploitation of the 
deep seabed would not only lead to industrial state dominance of this new resource frontier, but 
would also lead to a glut of minerals on commodity markets and falling resource prices”.192 In 
turn, the United Nations General Assembly in 1970 adopted Resolution 2749 (XXV), or the 
Declaration of Principles governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which stated that the seabed and ocean floor are part 
of the common heritage of mankind, putting a moratorium on resource extraction in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction for the time.
193
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The third UNCLOS conference beginning in 1973 and ending in 1982, was held in three 
countries, and included states, national liberation movements, non-governmental organizations, 
and other parties in what was a substantial meeting that led to substantial results.
194
 Again, there 
was significant debate about the territorial sea and the deep seabed and its resources. The 12 nm 
territorial sea was eventually agreed to, as well as a recognition of a coastal states’ right to 
resources offshore up to a distance of 200 nm as the basis for an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ), with a 24 nm contiguous zone (where a coastal state can has control over customs, fiscal, 
immigration and sanitary regulations) in between them under Article 33.
195
 
The UNCLOS today is the most current instantiation of the international law of the sea. It 
is a comprehensive, consensus-based, internationally-recognized legal mechanism (though not 
signed by Turkey, Venezuela, Israel, and the United States) representative of a great variety of 
voices (130 states signed), and is reflective of changes in the practices of states and non-state 
actors.
196
 Each version of the international law of the sea has been informed by a particular set of 
motivations (and namely economic) that directed a specific set of circumstances according to the 
will of the more dominant imperial power or nation-state. This is suggested by Anghie and his 
interpretation of the colonial origins of the law. The modern UNCLOS builds upon this 
foundation, suggesting possible challenges in delimiting Arctic territory among coastal states. 
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Chapter Four: The International Law of the Sea and the Canadian Arctic 
Just as it applies to other oceans, the UNCLOS applies to the Arctic Ocean as well, albeit 
slightly differently. This is because delimitations above water are subject to one set of rules. 
However, another set apply below the water, particularly in reference to the continental shelf. 
This is the area of the seafloor “adjacent to the coast where what is known as the continental 
margin slopes down gradually from the landmass into the sea until it begins to drop more sharply 
towards the deep ocean floor”.197  
The continental shelf, or margin, consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf itself 
(connecting to the coast), the slope (steepness is greater here), and rise (less steep) which extends 
into the deep seabed of the ocean floor, also called the “Area” under the UNCLOS (see Figure 
2).  
 
Figure 2: Canada’s maritime delimitations according to the UNCLOS.198 
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The UNCLOS grants a coastal state the rights to 200 nm of continental shelf and out to 
the limit of the continental margin, that is, where the rise meets the deep ocean floor, where the 
edge extends beyond 200 nm.
199
 In order for this to be extended further, a coastal state has to 
submit scientific data to the CLCS, an institution established by the UNCLOS that makes 
recommendations concerning the extent of this seafloor increase. Article 76 of the UNCLOS 
provides for these definitions and the specificities regarding the continental shelf and its outer 
reaches beyond what was originally conceived of in the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf which was then itself placed into the UNCLOS.
200
  
Effectively Article 76 established the rules that grant consistent limits to the continental 
shelf.
201
 It discusses the 200 nm limit, with two options for establishing an outer limit. The first 
consists of fixing the outer limit line by “straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles between 
points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least one per cent of the shortest 
distance from the foot of the continental slope”.202 The second requires fixing the outer limit by 
“straight lines not exceeding 60 nm between points not more than 60 nm from the foot of the 
slope”.203 However, this extension is not unlimited, but rather can be increased to 350 nautical 
miles from the baselines or beyond that and up to 100 nm from the 2500-meter depth. That is, 
under specific conditions, a coastal state’s continental shelf can be extended to 350 nm “if the 
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features of the seafloor in question strictly fulfill certain morphological and geological 
conditions”.204  
As such, a coastal state’s underwater territory is constitutive of the continental shelf, or, 
the extension of its land territory under the sea toward the outer limit of that extension.
205
 This 
coastal state has sovereign authority over the continental shelf. It does not have authority over 
what is called “the Area,” a juncture where the seabed and ocean floor meet, as well as places 
beyond the continental shelf, all of which are under the jurisdiction of the International Seabed 
Authority (ISA).
206
 In order to claim more of the seafloor, the coastal state must demonstrate that 
the continental shelf extends as a natural prolongation beyond the original 200nm limit, and 
submit this to the CLCS who can only make recommendations based on the scientific data given 
by the coastal state. If these are accepted, the claim is accepted. 
This is accomplished only by geological and geomorphological analysis. Article 76 of the 
UNCLOS defines the type of seafloor highs that have the potential to be considered natural 
prolongations of a state’s land territory: oceanic ridges, submarine ridges, and submarine 
elevations that are natural components of the continental margin.
207
 However, the definitions 
provided are vague. In reference to oceanic ridges paragraph 3 states that the continental margin 
must consist of “the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state,” as well as 
“the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise”.208 Similarly, paragraph 6 states that 
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“the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles” from the start, or 
baseline, of the territorial sea.
209
  
Based on these delineations, it is a geological possibility then that oceanic ridges share 
geological characteristics with the deep sea floor but not the continental margin which ends at 
the deep sea floor. Therefore, an oceanic ridge would not be included with the continental 
margin though a submarine ridge could because although it is not naturally part of the shelf, 
geological processes merged the two and while they are geologically different to a degree, they 
are fused, and so the outer limit cannot exceed 350 nm from the baseline as stated in paragraph 
6.
210
 Submarine elevations have the potential to extend the continental shelf of a coastal state 
since they are considered to be a natural prolongation of the continental margin. Thus, it could be 
extended beyond the 350nm limit if determined to be connected to the continental margin to the 
second constraint line of 100 nm beyond the 2500-metre depth.
211
  
All submissions must be made to the CLCS to secure “international recognition for the 
full extent of its continental shelf.”212 As a signatory to UNCLOS (the US has not signed as of 
April 2012), Canada’s submission in fulfillment of their obligations to map the seafloor is due in 
December 2013. This is significant for the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute because 
some of the natural resources it contains may actually be found beyond the 200 nautical mile 
limit from the Canadian coast. These rights could even be extended to 400 or 500 nautical miles 
according to the Standing Senate Committee on National Defense’s interpretation of the CLCS 
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rules.
213
 In this respect, Riddell-Dixon notes that the Convention ensures the “coastal state does 
not have to exercise sovereignty over the continental shelf in order to enjoy its rights,”214 as 
under international maritime law the state has exclusivity over such an area, and should a coastal 
state not explore these resources, another state cannot do so without express consent from the 
coastal state it is intruding on.
215
 
A coastal state must submit its proposal of the limit of their continental shelf within 10 
years of entry into the UNCLOS based on the distance from the coast or natural prolongation of 
the land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.
 
Once the data is compiled, and a 
submission made to the CLCS, these outer limits will be binding and not subject to change later, 
so it is integral to the process that best scientific research is conducted according to the principles 
identified under provisions of international law.
216
 
Canada’s submission to the CLCS involves a number of important federal agencies and 
tasks. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is involved because it 
is responsible for coordinating the submission and presenting it to the CLCS. Natural Resources 
Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans are essential to providing the scientific 
research necessary for a successful submission, as is the Canadian Hydrographic Service, 
particularly with bathymetric surveys that map the ocean floor. The Geological Survey of 
Canada is conducting seismic surveys as well, measuring the thickness of sediment “and the 
sound velocity of the rock structures to determine if the rocks are of the same composition as the 
continental shelf adjacent to Canada’s coastline,” in an effort to maximize Canada’s claim.217  
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The research is being or has been conducted in two periods of approximately two months 
each, one in the eastern and one in the western Arctic. Most of the research is completed and is 
being compiled as of June 2012 for a submission in 2013. The Beaufort Sea is located in the 
western Arctic, and efforts were initially problematic, particularly because travel was 
unsustainable due to ice floes.
218
 This research, conducted beginning in 2009, was very 
expensive because the ships needed could not carry enough fuel over long distances. It is 
something to consider should the route become navigable for longer parts of the year, and 
particularly for resource exploration and development. Relevant data was collected though, and it 
is likely that enough data was collected for a strong submission to the CLCS. 
However, the UNCLOS is not the only type of legal mechanism applicable to the law of 
the seas. Rather, the continuum upon which law has evolved as seen earlier, from divine, and 
natural law, to positive law, extends beyond treaty rights and into customary law as well. In this 
regard international law has undergone numerous revisions, reflecting changes in jurisdiction and 
state practice. Accordingly, the growth of international environmental law today is reflective of 
the necessity accompanying environmental change and the capacity of states to adapt to these 
changes in a more coordinated, equitable and effective way, in much the same way that natural 
law evolved to adapt to the needs of the time. As such, new principles for oceans governance that 
guided state behaviour were devised that altered activity on the oceans as priorities changed.  
Similarly, concepts today have evolved that reflect modern challenges concerning 
international law and its relationship to the oceans. They do not necessarily modify legal 
doctrines like the UNCLOS, but rather their ability to refocus legal interpretation under the 
UNCLOS has a legitimate affect on the implementation of the provisions and of the articles 
under the UNCLOS. For instance, obligations are made toward the protection of the marine 
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environment in Article 192 of the UNCLOS
219
 which represents a “reorientation of the law of the 
sea away from a purely instrumental attitude to ocean space, to one which recognized the need to 
protect the marine environment for the benefit of humanity as a whole both within and beyond 
limits of national jurisdiction”.220  
The principle of preventing transboundary harm, though found in customary law, is also 
found under Article 194, but has not been applied toward maritime issues as articulated in the 
UNCLOS.
221
 However, it implies a duty to cooperate which has become integral to pollution 
prevention in Part XII of the UNCLOS, particularly as it applies to the common heritage of 
humankind principle which states that the oceans belong to everyone (much like the Grotian 
view).
222
 In application, though, under the UNCLOS it only refers to mineral resources in the 
Area (places beyond national jurisdiction) “and is not a general principle for redistributing 
oceanic open access resources”.223 Rothwell and Stephens suggest that because the principle 
does not apply to the high seas in general, the principle should be referred to as the common 
concern of humankind when discussing areas beyond national jurisdiction.
224
 
These places are significant in the Arctic for a number of reasons, entertaining another 
precept of oceans governance: use of best scientific knowledge. Especially when determining 
boundaries of continental shelves as is currently the case or in terms of pollution for instance, the 
use of best scientific knowledge is a standard increasingly imposed in environmental assessments 
and decision-making, and it includes the requirement to use the best available techniques and 
practices. This prominent role given to various specialized areas of expertise in international 
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environmental law and policy-making has given rise to what Haas has called the building of 
“epistemic communities”.225 These are associated networks of “knowledge-based experts with an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise.”226 Members 
of these epistemic communities consist of “experts with professional training who enjoy social 
authority based on their reputation for impartial expertise,” who give advice based on this 
expertise, and usually include scientists and engineers when discussing environmental matters.
227
 
In turn, a few more principles associated with oceans governance and with application to 
the UNCLOS, but also more generally in international environmental law, are significant as 
potential deterrents to deleterious action in the Arctic environment. For example, the term 
ecosystem is mentioned in the UNCLOS as something necessary to protect, but the ecosystem 
approach has gained greater emphasis through Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 and has become integral 
to oceans governance, especially as it concerns the impact of human activities on an 
ecosystem.
228
  
Other principles include the precautionary principle stating that “where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.229 It evaluates the 
“likely environmental effects of a proposed activity,”230 so that decisions are made to proceed 
with effects understood, echoed in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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Union which states that this principle can be employed in response to possible danger to human, 
animal, or environmental health.
231
 It is intended to advance mitigation measures in advance of 
danger so that risk and uncertainty do not become reasons for inaction. These changes reflect the 
changing nature of international law according to modern demands. 
Other measures include the polluter-pays principle for instance, or principle 16 of the Rio 
Declaration, insisting that pollution costs are to be paid by the polluter, and the principle of 
sustainable development.
232
 The former is intended to be a reactive mechanism and is important 
in an Arctic marine environment given the difficulty in cleaning oil, for instance, from ice-cold 
waters should navigability be an option, or perhaps if offshore deep-seabed drilling. It is an 
assurance in some ways that preparations are made should something like a spill occur. This 
latter concerns the notion that “the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations,” very different than 
the previous principles advocating mare clausum or jus gentium.
233
  
 
Current Application 
These more modern retellings of historic legal principles have been maturing throughout 
the history of maritime travel and the origins of law relating to sea travel, reflective of the 
changing nature of state behaviour. As such, they set the basis for how current international law 
provides for the governance of the oceans in its adaptation to the changing Arctic environment 
and especially as it concerns areas beyond national jurisdiction, as identified by the UNCLOS. 
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Traditionally, as has been noted, oceans governance has involved ocean space being 
“divided into a multitude of areas within national jurisdiction, where individual states have 
exclusive or primary rights, and the areas beyond national jurisdiction where states enjoy 
unencumbered freedoms;” a mare liberum as it were.234 However, with the UNCLOS this is 
changing to focus on providing a legal framework that enables “a shift from a sovereign-rights 
and issue-specific perspective to an integrated approach to oceans management,” with the aim of 
fostering cooperation between states, with the goal of achieving common objectives.
235
 In this 
regard, governance has a specific purpose different from the “making and enforcement of 
decisions by a centralised formal authority” that government entails.236 Thus, oceans governance 
relates to formal and informal rules, institutions, concepts, adjudicative mechanisms and other 
activity occurring in the oceans and the way that space is used.
237
  
As such, oceans governance is a flexible objective and part of this has to do with a 
reliance on soft law and the development of a legitimate process that is both effective and current 
in the regulation of ocean use. This also has to do with transparency in participation and 
decision-making involving all stakeholders “including not only all interested states but also non-
state actors including civil society”.238 For instance, the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation and Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the 
Aarhus Convention, 1998), geared toward more domestic environmental issues, seeks the 
disclosure of environmental information, public participation in environmental decision-making, 
and access to justice.
239
 It could be applied internationally however, as articulated in article 3 (7) 
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of the Convention which requires signatories to apply the principles stated therein throughout 
international environmental decision-making processes.
240
  
Rothwell and Stephens advocate that this is relevant to oceans governance due to the 
OSPAR Arbitration case.
241
 The dispute, between Ireland the United Kingdom, “concerned 
access to information about a mixed oxide (“MOX”) fuel plant located at the Sellafield nuclear 
facility”.242 Here, Ireland was requesting access to deleted information from reports approving 
the plant about the potential environmental risks associated with a nuclear reprocessing plant 
under Article 9 of the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention).
243
 The United Kingdom declined to provide this 
information to Ireland on the basis that the information was not given due to commercial 
confidentiality. An arbitral tribunal “found that the information sought was not environmental 
information within the meaning of Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention,” leaving Ireland without 
this information and with only the negative environmental effects.
244
 
Consequently, while oceans governance remains malleable and flexible, the facilitation of 
oceans governance has increased with the global legal framework provided by the UNCLOS. 
Rothwell and Stephens identify three periods in its growth which will be discussed further later. 
Preliminarily however, in its initial phase, up until 1958, the focus was on state rights within a 
specifically delineated space, namely the territorial sea, with little discussion concerning more 
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transboundary issues like marine pollution.
245
 This was followed by a second phase from 1959 to 
1982 involving a more cooperative approach in combating marine environmental threats. This 
second phase was elucidated most notably under Principle 7 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment which sought to influence states in the shared objective of not only 
minimizing, but preventing sea pollution.
246
 Similarly, regional agreements were also devised 
alongside this more initial global framework, including the Regional Seas Programme of the 
United Nations Environmental Programme in an effort to continue a more cooperative approach 
to common environmental problems, particularly as they relate to Arctic marine resource 
exploitation, the monitoring of regional seas, and creating standards that could be used 
domestically, in national legislation.
247
 
This basis led to the development of a more comprehensive and constitutional UNCLOS 
in 1982, marking the beginning of the third phase, which seeks “the development of a holistic 
approach to managing ocean issues,” and thus “developed on the basis that all uses of the oceans 
are interrelated and therefore need to be addressed comprehensively”.248 Rothwell and Stephens 
see this change, especially from the first phase to the third, as one where the governance of ocean 
space shifts “from being concerned solely with sovereignty and jurisdictional rights and 
freedoms to being concerned also with a shared responsibility to protect and preserve all aspects 
of the marine environment”.249 
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 In ordering ocean space in this way, a fundamental shift occurs where the logic of state 
sovereignty over a specific jurisdiction, as dictated by law, is complemented by the necessity to 
protect that same space from undue harm. Namely in relation to the Arctic environment, Part XII 
of the UNCLOS seeks to establish a governance framework for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, especially from vessel-source, land-based and atmospheric pollution, 
and from intentional dumping.
250
 
Additional policy frameworks related to oceans governance have also been developed, 
but address more global environmental challenges rather than ocean space directly. The 1992 Rio 
Declaration does this through 27 principles which have direct impacts on oceans management, as 
does Agenda 21 which was developed through the Rio conference.
251
 Namely, Chapter 17 of 
Agenda 21, which seeks to address maritime issues “is regarded as the main international 
blueprint for sustainable oceans governance,” as it provides ways to “achieve sustainable 
development of the oceans, coastal areas, and seas through the programme areas of integrated 
management and sustainable development of coastal areas”.252  
In a similar way, in 2002, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation which was 
developed during the World Summit on Sustainable Development included similar desirable 
ideals aimed at achieving an effective governance regime. These ideals consisted of states 
assuming the dominant position in governance affairs and called for, among other things, the 
ratification of the UNCLOS, the implementation of Agenda 21, the application of the ecosystem 
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approach under the United Nations, and stronger coordination amongst all states with the goal of 
achieving more sustainable development practices (particularly as they relate to fish stocks).
253
  
These principles and ideals apply to the Arctic environment just as they apply to any 
other environment. Moreover, a number of developments seek to protect the Arctic marine 
environment through legal mechanisms. The Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment, and the accompanying Strategy (AEPS), were signed in 1991 between the eight 
Arctic states consisting of objectives designed to identify major pollutants more concretely and 
implement strategies to reduce them.
254
 Three northern indigenous groups were also included: 
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous 
Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation, and given equal 
voice in discussion (though not entirely in practice), and made Permanent Participants.
255
  
However, the AEPS was not an international treaty, but a voluntary agreement intending 
for parties to meet regularly to “determine the nature and extent of the specific environmental 
problems and to examine options to remedy them through cooperative action,” particularly 
through four working groups including the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response (EPPR), and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF).
256
  
The function of AMAP is to “determine the levels of anthropogenic pollutants in the 
Arctic,” and to study the effects of these pollutants in an effort to reduce them, much like PAME 
which seeks to analyze environmental threats against the Arctic marine environment (especially 
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land-based activities, offshore oil and gas activities, and shipping) and the ability of international 
mechanisms to deal with them.
257
 The EPPR has been relatively inactive in its role in 
coordinating emergency responses to environmental disasters, but rather only focused on risk 
assessment and guidelines for response while the CAFF, in enhancing monitoring of biological 
diversity and the conservation of ecological integrity, has been very effective in information 
sharing activities with states involved.
258
 As such, soft legal measures concerning the protection 
of the Arctic environment are effective when implemented and followed (though not binding). 
Thus, the objectives of environmental protection must compete with conflicting objectives, 
including industrial development. 
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Chapter Five: The Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute 
 
In 1962, with a number of maritime legal principles in place, though not yet codified in its 
modern form, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1803. On a push by a 
number of newly independent states, and particularly in the Third World, this resolution sought 
to protect resource rights in those countries, giving these nations permanent sovereignty over 
these resources.
259
 Demonstrating a definite link between resource rights and sovereignty, the 
Resolution declared that “the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their 
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and 
of the well-being of the people of the State concerned”.260 
As such, “contemporary international environmental law is rooted in concepts that aim to 
balance competing sovereign interests”.261 This is true anywhere then, including the Arctic 
environment, which it attempts to secure as a space of mutual cooperation between states, 
mediated by a common understanding under evolving international law, toward the potential 
sustainable development and use of the area.  
The national response in Canada for the defense and protection of its Arctic territory has 
thus far been framed as a defense of Canada’s “status as a sovereign state”.262 Framing the 
national policy response this way ignores regional variation and specific issues. Rather, when 
discussing the issue of defending sovereign territory, attention shifts to matters dealing with the 
military within the scope of, and with the impetus of, Arctic environmental change. Endorsing 
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the discussion this way ignores other aspects of Arctic environmental change without 
acknowledging the nature or significance of these issues which include disturbances in 
traditional ways of life, dramatic increases in temperature, salinity and acidification, rising sea-
levels, disruptions in wind-driven ocean currents, permafrost instability and decreasing thickness 
of sea ice in northern climates.  
Similarly, such a framing overlooks the history of what sovereignty actually means, 
degrading its conceptual basis by reducing its meaning to little more than an expense in a 
military budget. Quite significantly, it paints the entire Arctic region with one brush, ignoring the 
specificity of disputed territory which puts that sovereignty into question in the first instance.  
Anghie has argued that sovereignty was shaped by the colonial experience, reproducing 
the inequalities associated with that type of systematically abusive relationship in the name of 
progress, emancipation, and rights. However, in this regard, “sovereignty is a flexible instrument 
which readily lends itself to the powerful imperative of the civilizing mission, in part because it 
is through engagement with that mission that sovereignty extends and expands its reach and 
scope”.263 Conceptually, the governance structure imposed by sovereignty can be reconstituted 
and applied to governance questions as the law continues to evolve, though still reflecting 
historical tendencies.  
The Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute is symbolic in this sense, affected not only 
by climate change, but a structure imposed by sovereign nations following an international 
maritime law and who are committed to extending their continental shelves for the purposes of 
claiming hydrocarbon resources according to this law. The coalescing of these characteristics 
renders the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute rather complex. It does not have its origins 
in a recent disagreement or interpretation of the term sovereignty. Rather, its origins are in fact 
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much older. Each country’s position is based on treaties from the nineteenth century, and thus 
took shape under conditions which were drastically different than they are today.  
Accordingly, Canada has asserted that the maritime border must follow the land border 
which is set at the 141
st
 meridian, followed straight north.
264
 This is based on the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg, 1825, signed between Russia and Britain, the rights of which were taken on by the 
United States (US) when it purchased Alaska in 1867 and by Canada when it took on Britain’s 
rights in 1880.
265
 The Canadian position is that the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1825, is evidence of 
the establishment of a land border and a maritime boundary following the 141
st
 meridian.
266
 The 
US has said that this boundary is to be followed only to the coast and that an equidistance line is 
more than capable of delimiting the boundary.
267
  
As the disputed area enters into the maritime boundary of the US according to the 
American delineation, this boundary must change to abide by a “general principle of equity” 
which requires “that every point on the boundary be an equal distance from each of the two 
adjacent coasts”.268 Due to the border of Alaska, which leans slightly eastward to the east-
southeast from Point Barrow, more of the disputed space would be in American territory 
according to this equity principle.
269
 By this method, the US would have control over a 21,500 
square kilometer area of the Beaufort Sea that Canada continues to lay claim to (see Figure 3).
270
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Figure 3: The Canadian and American claims to the disputed area of the Beaufort Sea.
271
 
 
There are indications, however, that Canada’s claim may succeed should geologists 
determine that sediment accumulation on the floor of the Beaufort Sea comes from silt draining 
from the Mackenzie River which would mean that this area is considered to be a natural 
prolongation of the Canadian continent according to the UNCLOS rules.
272
  
Still, new information also provides an alternative scenario that the Canadian government 
could use in resolution of the dispute. The US interpretation would actually favour Canada when 
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applying it to the central and northern parts of the Beaufort Sea, “pushing the boundary between 
the two countries on a roughly 45-degree angle farther to the northwest and eventually to a point 
above 80 degrees north, where it would intersect with the US-Russia maritime boundary”.273  
Interestingly, the Canadian interpretation of the boundary entitles the US to much more 
territory undersea the further north the sea proceeds, giving slightly greater territorial 
considerations to Canada only in the southern part of the Beaufort Sea where much of the natural 
resource pool lies. This is a more recent development that should have some effect on 
negotiations going forward. The current boundary moves away from the mainland of both the 
Canadian and US coasts, and the further north the boundary is demarcated, the more Canada’s 
Banks Island is affected by the US formula, moving the maritime border west which effectively 
expands Canada’s area and claim. An extension of the continental shelf would thus impact both 
countries in interesting ways. The Banks Island proposition affects the equidistance line 
profoundly by crossing over the 141
st
 meridian, leaning toward the maritime boundary between 
the US and Russia.
274
 Baker and Byers suggest that this would “leave a large disputed area of 
extended continental shelf to the west of the 141
st
 meridian and east of the equidistance line,” 
and thus the US position would favour Canada while the Canadian position would favour the US 
beyond the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone set by the UNCLOS.
275
 
Consequently, the Canadian and American legal positions differ in some ways, but 
ultimately help the other the further north the continental shelf is extended. The Canadian 
position can succeed for a number of reasons. Under the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1825, article 
three delineates the object and purpose of delimitation between Russia and Great Britain:  
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Commencing from the Southern-most Point of the Island called Prince of Wales Island, which Point 
lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes, North Latitude, and between the 131st and 133rd Degree 
of West Longitude (Meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the North along the Channel 
called Portland Channel, as far as the Point of the Continent where it strikes the 56th Degree of North 
Latitude; from this last mentioned Point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the 
mountains situated parallel to the Coast, as far as the point of intersection of the 141st Degree of West 
Longitude (of the same Meridian); and, finally, from the said point of intersection, the said Meridian 
Line of the 141st Degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the limit between 
the Russian and British Possessions on the Continent of America to the North West.276 
 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says that object and purpose are two 
principles of a treaty that are available to guide interpretation of international law.
277
 In 
delimiting a boundary along the 141
st
 degree, the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1825, is consistent 
with its object and purpose, strengthening the Canadian claim. 
Similarly, Baker and Byers suggest that the US had previously agreed to use the 141
st
 
degree boundary until 1976, when Canada, which had previously issued oil and gas exploration 
permits in the 1960s (just prior to the legislation of the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act), issued further concessions in the disputed area of the Beaufort Sea.
278
 Canada used the 141
st
 
meridian defense when the US protested to this action, delimiting a 200 nautical mile fishing 
zone, prior to the UNCLOS and the exclusive economic zone.
279
 Baker and Byers also consider 
the fact that in the 1867 Treaty of Cessation of Alaska to the US, the 141
st
 meridian was used as 
part of the eastern limit of the territory, and accepted until 1990 when the US and the Soviet 
Union updated the Treaty.
280
 This means that the US should accept the boundary in the east if it 
does so in the west. 
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The American argument stems from a few different conclusions. Given that an 
equidistance line benefits Canada by effectively giving more territory to Canada, Baker and 
Byers identify that the US “could argue that a literal construction of the English-language text of 
the 1825 Treaty….produces a different interpretation from that preferred by Canada”.281 In this 
regard, the US might consider addressing the “fact that national jurisdiction in 1825 extended 
only a short distance offshore, and that the negotiators of the 1825 Treaty could not possibly 
have sought to delimit a boundary they did not know existed”.282 A similar discrepancy is found 
in the language of the 1825 Treaty which delimits a boundary “as far as the Frozen Ocean” and 
the 1867 Treaty which delimits a boundary “into the same Frozen Ocean”.283 The language based 
on the 1867 Treaty sought to delimit a maritime boundary while the 1825 Treaty concerned land 
possessions divided among imperial powers, including water.
284
 However, given current 
definitions concerning delimitations of maritime boundaries, and the fact that most Arctic 
nations, aside from the US, have accepted the terms of the UNCLOS, this approach seems 
worthy of discussion but unsubstantial in a claim. In this regard, Baker and Byers argue that the 
main issue is whether the 1825 Treaty could apply to offshore territory under international law 
and “whether the 1867 Treaty confirms that intention”.285  
However, Baker and Byers have noted specifically that “state practice with regard to the 
delimitation of outer continental shelves remains too limited and variable to generate customary 
international law, and there are no International Court decisions on the matter”.286 Maritime 
boundary decisions are few and far between, the last being the Black Sea Case in 2009.  
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The 2009 Black Sea Case is an important one, offering a glimpse into what may occur 
should the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute require adjudication, and at the least, 
offering precedent. In this case, Romania, in 2004, filed an Application instituting proceedings 
against Ukraine suggesting that the two countries needed to establish a maritime boundary 
between them in the Black Sea as a “delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zones of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea”.287 The nature of the disagreement 
concerns the limits of the maritime boundary, especially since an island between them, Serpent’s 
Island, could belong to either given each country’s own delimitations. Given that there are no 
real hostilities between the countries and that existing maritime treaties delimiting other areas 
with Ukraine (both under Soviet control and after independence), the court decided a boundary 
for the two nations based on the 2003 State Border Regime Treaty, giving both nations access 
based on equidistance lines.
288
 
Similarly, the case also prescribed a three-part process for determining maritime 
boundaries. First, the Court establishes an equidistance line; second, it determines whether this 
line should be adjusted; and finally, it ensures that according to international law, no state 
disproportionately benefits. Baker and Byers suggest that such a process heavily favours an ad 
hoc reasoning based on the configuration of a coastline to govern a maritime boundary, ignoring 
the entire land territory since historically “it is sovereignty over land territory that generates 
rights to maritime jurisdiction”.289 Problematically, in a case like the Beaufort Sea, features like 
the concavity of a coastline, islands, differences in coast size, can have disproportionate effects 
on the decision according to international law. Thus, other factors including socioeconomics, 
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environmental effects, or security are not considered as strongly as geography. Also, given that 
the Court used a previous agreement between Romania and the Ukraine as a basis for their 
decision, it would seem that bilateral discussions between neighbours is more adequate in 
resolving this disagreement. 
However, the three-part process listed above says nothing of the role the geomorphology 
of the continental shelf and adjoining seabed plays in considering maritime delimitations. Legal 
precedent from the Court suggests that the characteristics of the seabed, in drawing a continental 
shelf boundary, have not been taken into account. This stems from the 1985 Libya-Malta Case 
where the Court determined that even considering the exclusive economic zone, 
geomorphological characteristics of the coast and outward do not play a role in maritime 
boundaries when the coasts are in short distance from each other, namely, 400 nautical miles.
290
  
While the details of this case are complex historically, this type of ruling offers an 
interesting critique of maritime delineation, contrary to that espoused by the UNCLOS. What it 
suggests is that geomorphological features should not factor into the disputed area, when the 
UNCLOS definitely suggests this to be the case, and the entire point behind the CLCS 
submissions. Since the space between the countries is so short in nautical terms, suggesting that 
natural prolongations do not offer the same conclusive ruling as distance is not factual beyond 
the exclusive economic zone. No further decisions have resolved this discrepancy as of yet, 
complicating matters to some degree. 
This variability in delimiting an extended continental shelf boundary does not contribute 
to a resolution of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute. Part of the reason is that little 
information currently exists concerning the geomorphology of the seabed, which is why the 
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CLCS submission is valuable in determining the extent of the natural prolongation of Canada’s 
continental shelf north of the Mackenzie Delta. 
As such, the dispute seems to be in a holding pattern until scientific data is collected by 
Canada. This could be further complicated should the US ratify the UNCLOS agreement, giving 
them a further ten years before they would need to submit their scientific findings. All 
indications suggest that the US is going to ratify. According to an Associated Press article 
entitled “Clinton brings message of cooperation to Arctic amid competing claims in resource-
rich region,” the Obama administration is looking for US Senate approval of the UNCLOS, 
particularly in order to identify and utilize the oil, gas, and mineral reserves located there.
291
  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry echoed a similar view, 
pushing for the ratification of the UNCLOS, having had the support of multiple administrations, 
the Democratic Party, and the US Navy, viewing the UNCLOS as necessary to advancing 
American interests amidst the multinational system that currently governs the seas.
292
 Senator 
Lisa Murkowski of Alaska has similarly stated her preference for American accession to the 
UNCLOS stating that it is very important the US ratify the agreement if a claim to territory is to 
be made successfully, especially because this would ensure American interests are protected 
under law, respected by the international community.
293
 
In a speech delivered at the Law of the Sea Symposium in Washington D.C. in May 
2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made it very clear that it was time for the US to 
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“fully assert its role as a global leader, and accede to this important treaty,” as UNCLOS is the 
most important and fundamental “legal instrument underpinning public order across the maritime 
domain”.294 He also noted that without having ratified the Convention, the US is “at a distinct 
disadvantage, particularly when it comes to disputes over maritime rights and responsibility”.295 
Though the Secretary does not mention the Beaufort Sea specifically, he makes the point 
of noting two related areas. The Secretary suggests that there is “broad support” for the 
UNCLOS amongst major US industries, namely from “companies that are dealing with offshore 
energy, shipbuilding, commercial shipping” and others concerned with offshore resources.296 
Correspondingly, he also suggests that accession to the Convention “would ensure our ability to 
reap the benefits of the opening of the Arctic- a region of increasingly important maritime 
security and economic interest”.297 The Secretary goes on to mention that the availability of a 
new shipping route and the presence and accessibility of natural resources as Arctic sea ice 
recedes requires American accession to the UNCLOS. Expectations that navigability could be 
possible are misleading however, and depend on the time of year, season, technological 
availability, and weather patterns.  
According to Furgal and Prowse of Natural Resources Canada, there is not expected to be 
winter shipping at all since this is very difficult as winter ice is colder and stronger than summer 
ice, and thus, more difficult to traverse.
298
 Griffiths suggests that sea ice retreat in the Canadian 
Arctic specifically is “neither so rapid nor so predictable” as the somewhat reductionist 
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hypothesis of the global warming persuasion seems to convey.
299
 Travers disagrees on these 
points, depicting Arctic sovereignty as an issue of control, while Huebert suggests it is about 
security and that delayed action is unwanted.
300
 Huebert argues that Griffiths is correct in 
challenging “the prevailing efforts to apply policy to the current scientific understanding of 
climate change,” but suggests that scientific uncertainty or difference of opinion based on those 
facts is no reason to delay action, particularly as sea ice is melting at an accelerating rate.
301
  
Conversely, to Griffiths this explanation leads to the simplistic conclusion that a 
reduction in sea ice cover means a “retreat of sea ice in the archipelago to a point where the 
Northwest Passage becomes powerfully attractive for summer-months and even year-round 
intercontinental shipping,” although the science behind this theory suggests otherwise.302 In 
effect, this “sovereignty-on-thinning-ice thesis,” as Griffiths refers to it, is really “built on 
untenable assumptions of relatively speedy and undifferentiated ice-cover reduction throughout 
the archipelago and indeed the Arctic region.”303 The theory, he argues, disregards specific 
variations in sea ice duration (noted in a previous section) and “relies on assumptions of 
uniformity in constructing grounds for an international challenge to Canada’s jurisdiction”.304  
Stephen Carmel, a senior vice-president at the world’s largest shipping company, Maersk 
Line, has similarly suggested that sea ice will continue to be a factor in shipping, as will weather 
there which reduces visibility.
305
 Carmel does not expect the Arctic to be usable until at least 
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2050.
306
 Thus, there is too much uncertainty regarding the physical conditions necessary for 
suitable Arctic navigation, as determined by Secretary Panetta, to mount a direct challenge to 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty in any real physical sense right now. 
Secretary Panetta’s most salient recommendation for American accession to UNCLOS 
however, is that the UNCLOS “is the only means for international recognition and acceptance of 
our extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic, and we are the only Arctic nation that is not 
party to the Convention”.307 International maritime law, in this sense, holds an important 
strategic position within modern maritime claims as it reflects a history that informs an ever-
changing present. This is done through adjudication at international institutions (International 
Court of Justice), policy discussion at many levels (United States Department of Defense), and 
academia to name but a few forums.  
These are not static positions though, and just as they are informed by the past, they 
affect each other’s decision-making processes. This interdisciplinary approach to decision-
making is elucidated by Secretary Panetta’s quote above, suggesting that accession to 
international maritime law is the best way of achieving not only acceptance from an international 
community of states, organizations, corporations, and people, but of achieving domestic 
priorities while reducing uncertainty by holding all parties to the same standards. The quote 
demonstrates the strongest indication that ratification is not only going to happen, but in the not-
too-distant-future, which could only bode well for the resolution of the Beaufort Sea maritime 
boundary dispute.  
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Chapter Six: The High Stakes of Resource Development in the Beaufort Sea 
The history of Arctic discovery shows how the development of the human race has always been 
borne along by great illusions.308  
 
Before we can make decisions about our future use of oil and gas and related decisions about 
protecting endangered species, native communities and the health of our planet, we need to know 
what’s out there….so that the global community can make those difficult decisions.309 
 
The Foreign Policy Statement says that the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute, 
regardless of US accession to the UNCLOS, legal precedent, or historic treaty rights, is a 
disagreement that “is well managed, neither posing defense challenges for Canada nor 
diminishing Canada’s ability to collaborate and cooperate with its Arctic neighbours”.310 The 
intention of the Government is that these ‘boundary issues’ will be worked out “with our 
neighbours to explore the possibility of resolving them in accordance with international law”.311  
However, given the demand for natural resources and the increased attention on the 
Arctic, also noted by the US Secretary of Defense among others, there are also indications that 
the dispute could intensify. Namely, oil prices remain high at around $125 a barrel with global 
demand for oil expected to rise to over 100 million barrels a day by 2030.
312
 This will likely 
remain constant in the long-term amidst increasing demand from China and other emerging 
markets.
313
 This is important because the disputed area of the Beaufort Sea is thought to contain 
at minimum 1 billion cubic metres of oil and 1.7 billion cubic metres of gas.
314
 Comparatively, 
                                               
308 Charles Emmerson, “Fridtjof Nansen, 1911 (quote),” in The Future History of the Arctic, (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2010), at 1. 
309 United States Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic, Director Mark Myers,” published 2008, available from: 
<http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980>, (accessed May 12, 2012), at paragraph 4. 
310 Foreign Policy Statement, at 8. 
311 Ibid., at 8. 
312 The Economist (Finance and Economics), “Keeping it to themselves: Gulf states not only pump oil; they burn it 
too,” published March 31, 2012, available from: <http://www.economist.com/node/21551484>, (accessed May 30, 
2012), at paragraph 15. 
313 Ibid., at paragraph 1. 
314 Sian Griffiths, BBC News, “US-Canada Arctic border dispute key to maritime riches,” updated August 2, 2010, 
available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10834006>, (accessed April 10, 2012), at paragraph 
17. 
79 
 
this little area contains a similar amount of oil and gas to that of the largest oil field in North 
America in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.
315
 
Moreover, the US Geological Survey (USGS) has estimated that the entire area north of 
the Arctic Circle contains approximately 90 billion barrels “of undiscovered, technically 
recoverable oil, 1670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas, and 44 billion 
barrels of technically recoverable natural gas liquids,” that is, those that are ready for production 
according to present industry practice and available technology.
316
 Effectively, these are 
resources that could potentially account for “about 22 percent of the undiscovered, technically 
recoverable resources in the world,” mainly offshore (estimated at 84 percent), amounting to 
approximately “13 percent of undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the undiscovered natural gas, and 
20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in the world”.317 The most recent research by 
the USGS also suggests that approximately half of these resources can be found in three geologic 
areas: the Amerasia Basin, the East Greenland Rift Basins, and Arctic Alaska.
318
  
Arctic Alaska directly borders the Beaufort Sea and is affected by the same weather 
patterns, sea currents, and ice floes that affect the Yukon portion of the Beaufort Sea. It is also 
thus geologically consistent with the sea, indicating a possibility exists that the same resources 
found closer to Alaska can be found closer to the Arctic Canadian coast. As such, the delimiting 
of a maritime boundary under rules of international law in Beaufort Sea is of great concern, 
particularly as exploration around the sea and deeper into the Arctic Ocean is gaining 
momentum. Over 400 oil and gas fields beyond the Arctic Circle have already been discovered, 
accounting “for approximately 40 billion barrels of oil, more than 1100 trillion cubic feet of gas, 
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and 8.5 billion barrels of natural gas liquids”.319 Thus, given demand for oil and the supply that 
exists, it is not inconceivable that the disputed area will be of continued value to both Canada 
and the US, and why a resolution is in both of their interests. 
Although international law relating to the Beaufort Sea has been in evolution for a 
substantial period of time, considering the Beaufort Sea as a potential hydrocarbon province is 
more recent. While the first oil from the Arctic region to be traded throughout Europe and North 
America was whale oil used to light lamps as early as 1619, the recovery of hydrocarbons is 
relatively new by comparison, as only in 1888 was it determined that the area around the 
Mackenzie River could hold petroleum reserves.
320
 In 1920, Theodore August Link led an 
American expedition into the Norman Wells area of the Northwest Territories that struck oil. Not 
far from the Beaufort Sea coast onshore, the find was thought to be the largest potential oil field 
in the world at the time, although there was great hesitation in developing the site due to the 
difficulty in transporting the oil by the only possible means at the time: rail.
321
 
The reality was that there was no interest in constructing a railway or pipeline because 
Norman Wells was producing 100 barrels a day by the end of 1920, and while demand for 
gasoline rose (1.03 million barrels of oil a day in 1920 to 2.58 million barrels by 1929), new 
fields in the American West were much more easily accessible and thus cheaper to explore, 
produce, and transport.
322
 This changed for a period during the Second World War. Drilling at 
the Norman Wells site produced one million barrels a year by 1944, supplying American demand 
through three pipelines built specifically to take oil to Alaska and the Yukon.
323
 Once the war 
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was over, the new wells were capped, while the older wells continued to supply local populations 
with oil. 
The following years saw increased competition from cheaper Middle Eastern oil, price 
changes affecting exploration and production. However, with the Norman Wells field still 
producing 471,000 barrels of oil in 1950, continued efforts to identify other potential fields in the 
Mackenzie Delta increased, starting with the Geological Survey of Canada and Dome Petroleum, 
drilling a first commercial well (though run dry) by 1962. At around this time the Canadian 
government supported the creation of Panarctic Oils Limited, an exploration company, which 
struck a major gas field at Drake Point on Melville Island in 1969, on King Christian Island in 
1970, and an oil field on Cameron Island in 1974, while Imperial Oil struck oil at Atkinson Point 
in 1970 and natural gas near Tuktoyaktuk in 1971.
324
 These coincided with the discovery of 
hydrocarbons at Prudhoe Bay, deeming that the dream of Arctic oil production was a possibility, 
particularly as world oil shortages and price increases, resulting from unrest in the oil-rich 
Middle East, made the idea of further potential discoveries relevant.
325
 So much so, that by 1982, 
oil companies were paying $2.07 billion for drilling rights in the Beaufort Sea.
326
 
Mathews has identified a total of 33 wells drilled between 1972 and 1989, with Dome 
Petroleum (partially financed by millions of dollars in loans from Japan) introducing drill-ships 
capable of exploration in the Beaufort Sea up to 60 meters deep during this time with the aid of 
the National Energy Program (NEP) in 1980 a little later.
327
 The NEP was designed, through a 
number of programs, to accomplish three stated objectives: to provide for Canadian energy 
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independence from the world oil market, to establish fairness in revenue sharing, and to increase 
opportunities for Canadian participation and ownership in the energy industry.
328
  
This was a beneficial program to Canadian oil companies exploring the Beaufort Sea and 
other areas in the Arctic Ocean at the time, providing for financial support from taxpayers 
through initiatives like the Petroleum Incentive Program (PIP) which offered grants that 
supported the building and advancement of drilling arms and icebreakers.
329
 In effect, the PIP 
was intended to complement the NEP’s stated objective of increasing Canadian ownership of 
Canada’s oil industry from 27 percent to 50 percent by 1990 by awarding financial grants to 
encourage exploration, development, and production.
330
 For example, PIPs covered 35 percent of 
costs for exploration conducted on provincial land and 80 percent of costs for exploration 
conducted on frontier lands, including the Arctic, for companies that were at least 75 percent 
Canadian-owned.
331
 Conversely, companies that were less than 50 percent Canadian-owned 
received no grants for exploration conducted on provincial land, and only 25 percent of costs 
were covered for exploration on frontier lands.
332
 Eventually this support wavered with a change 
in federal government, as the Conservative Party came to power in 1985 and discarded the 
National Energy Program amid decreasing oil prices and more accessible zones of exploration.  
However, roughly 300,000 barrels of oil were produced from the Beaufort Sea during the 
period the National Energy Program was in effect.
333
 More recently, offshore exploration in the 
Beaufort Sea for hydrocarbon resources is increasing as sea ice extent and thickness decline, 
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making some areas much more accessible, and as oil prices continue to increase. Most 
companies conducting exploratory activities are international oil companies though, as incentive 
programs for domestic companies as effective as the NEP are not available.  
Corporations including Imperial Oil and British Petroleum (BP) compete for the right to 
explore and potentially develop a parcel of land, whether onshore or offshore, in a process 
regulated by the National Energy Board under the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, 1985, 
with exploration licenses issued pursuant to the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, 1985 
(sections 22 to 27). The Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development opens the 
bidding to industry for these exploration rights with a Call for Nominations, giving industry the 
opportunity to determine areas of interest, followed by a Call for Bids, allowing corporations the 
ability to submit their interest for a specific area.
334
 The Call for Bids is open for 120 days and 
can be found in the Canada Gazette.
335
  
Once the bidding time is complete, exploration rights are determined through a bidding 
process in which the successful bidder is the one that presents the highest single-bid for 
expenditures planned on the exploration of the land block.
336
 Thus, the successful bid relies on 
how much a corporation, for instance, is seeking to spend on exploration. This exploration 
license lasts for two years, and is divided into two terms, in which time the “successful bidder is 
expected to spend the dollar value of the license” with at least one well being drilled during the 
first term.
337
 A significant discovery licence follows successful exploration and allows the 
exploration tenure to continue indefinitely should resources be found.
338
 It is a feature that 
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rewards the successful exploration of an area, granting tenure over an extended period of time, so 
that production is not rushed.
339
 Finally, a production licence is issued for a discovery that can be 
commercialized and exists over a twenty-five year term that can be renewed if the area still 
produces oil.
340
 
Imperial Oil and BP Exploration won bids in 2007 and 2008 that entitled them a license 
to explore areas of the Beaufort Sea. Imperial Oil won a bid to explore the deeper waters of the 
sea with a bid of $585 million and BP won a bid to explore close to Imperial Oil with a bid of 
$1.2 billion.
341
 In 2010, Imperial Oil, Exxon Mobil, and BP formed a conglomerate venture for 
the exploration of ten billion barrels of oil in the Beaufort Sea with Imperial and Exxon each 
holding a 25 percent stake and BP the remaining 50 percent.
342
 Chevron Canada won a similar 
bid in even deeper waters (nearly 2000 meters deep) with a purchase price of $103 million in 
2010.
343
 This summer (2012), Chevron Canada will be preparing to do seismic work in the 
Beaufort Sea, an area of approximately 2060 square kilometers located 120 kilometers 
offshore.
344
 Seismic testing is the first step in preparation for a sustained exploration of the area 
to determine the geomorphology of the area to determine the potential oil and gas reserves there. 
Such exploration occurs in various places in the Beaufort Sea, typically between 69°N 
latitude to 72°N latitude and between 132°W longitude and 140°W longitude, which is 
effectively the same area being disputed by Canada and the US. However, conditions in the 
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Beaufort Sea are not ideal for exploration as it is “predominantly a frozen sea with open water 
generally occurring only between July and October, although winds and currents can quickly 
bring the ice pack close to shore during the open water season.”345 Similarly, in shallow water 
this creates moving ice packs leading to unpredictability in navigation and transport, made even 
more difficult under conditions of near total darkness surrounding the region between late 
October and until March.
346
 Add to this the fact that drilling operators and environmental and 
governmental regulators lack experience in the production of oil and gas from the Beaufort Sea, 
there is substantial cause for concern that a spill could occur (although the equipment necessary 
for this is not available yet). Further, there would be a tremendous difficulty in response to a 
spill, including a lack of fundamental infrastructure necessary to deal with a spill (roads, 
personnel) and responding in an unforgiving climate.
347
 
Under such circumstances, a spill of any scale is a possibility. To protect against 
disastrous spills, new filing requirements have been instituted for offshore drilling in the 
Canadian Arctic. This new policy involves drilling a relief well in the same area as the main well 
and during the same season (the Same Season Relief Well Policy).
348
 Thus, should a drilling 
seasons consist of 100 days, the first 50 days would be used to drill the first and main well, the 
next 50 days would be used to build the relief well.
349
 The stated outcome of instituting such a 
policy is one of contingency to “minimize harmful impacts on the environment” by immediately 
responding to a well that is malfunctioning.
350
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In 2009, Imperial Oil, supported by other companies and the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers, approached the National Energy Board in an attempt to ease this rule 
considering that the Arctic building season is too short to accommodate the construction of two 
wells.
351
 Imperial Oil argued that “a same-season relief well would essentially block deepwater 
drilling in the energy rich Arctic,” suggesting that measures focused on spill prevention were 
more appropriate, although they also said that a spill could continue spilling “for up to three 
years before a relief well could be drilled”.352 
The National Energy Board (NEB) instead agreed to review its offshore drilling 
regulations in consideration of these novel circumstances and the April 20, 2010, spill of British 
Petroleum’s Macondo Well in the Gulf of Mexico. The NEB created the Arctic Offshore Review 
in response, attempting to get ahead of any such event by existing, seeking to examine the best 
information that is available to come to the best recommendation possible concerning spill risks, 
injury risks, and prevention procedures and costs associated with drilling.
353
 In that regard, the 
NEB “will likely recommend an increase in the current liability limits of $40 million established 
for Arctic exploration.
354
 Recent Ecojustice work also suggests that such a liability limit must 
undergo review as clarification about what is covered under this cap is necessary, as well as 
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whether the current cap is high enough to account for the potential environmental damage that 
could occur.
355
 
Furthermore, as of June 2012, the NEB’s role in the approvals process for oil and gas 
operations has been changed under amendments to Bill C-38, or, the Jobs, Growth and Long-
term Prosperity Act.
356
 Namely, these amendments give the Governor in Council (GIC), who 
reports to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and thus Cabinet, 
greater power in a number of approvals processes including licensing for the construction of oil 
and gas infrastructure (granting Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity or CPCNs).
357
 
Previously, the GIC could reject such certificate applications already approved by the NEB, but 
could not give approval to an application that had been denied by the NEB.
358
 With these 
amendments, this is now possible.  
Also, timelines for the assessment of a CPCN application must now be made to the 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development within fifteen months of receipt, with 
the GIC making a final decision.
359
 This means that final decision-making power rests with the 
federal cabinet and not the NEB, whose role now shifts to an organization responsible for 
environmental assessment.
360
 Thus, the NEB “will have to submit all future decisions on major 
                                               
355 Pierre Hamilton, “Oil Companies Should Pay Full Cost of Arctic Oil Spill,” Ecojustice.ca, updated Sept. 16, 
2011, available from: <http://www.ecojustice.ca/blog/oil-companies-should-pay-full-cost-of-arctic-offshore-oil-
spill?searchterm=Arctic>, (accessed July 18, 2012), at paragraph 7. 
356 House of Commons of Canada, “Bill C-38: An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget table in 
Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures,” First Session, Forty-first Parliament, 60-61 Elizabeth II, 2011-
2012, passed June 29, 2012, available from: 
<http://parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5524772&file=4>, (accessed July 18, 2012), at 
Sections 52-54. 
357 Lars Olthafer and Katie Slipp, “Bill C-38 Expected to Have Significant Impact on National Energy Board 
Powers,” Blake, Cassels, and Graydon, LLP, updated July 19, 2012, available from: 
<http://www.blakes.com/english/view_disc.asp?ID=5486>, (accessed July 24, 2012), at paragraph 3. 
358 Ibid., at paragraph 4. 
359 House of Commons of Canada, “Bill C-38,” at Section 58. 
360 Olthafer and Slipp, “Bill C-38 Expected to Have Significant Impact on National Energy Board Powers,” at 
paragraph 2. 
88 
 
pipeline projects to Cabinet for approval,” including projects that the NEB does not approve.361 
This gives Cabinet the ability to request further review of a specific project by the NEB or to go 
through with the approval, as the federal government streamlines the approvals process for large-
scale resource development. This suggests that should any exploration and production occur in 
the Canadian Beaufort Sea going forward, it will have been approved by the federal government. 
Conversely, in the US as of March 2012, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement approved an Oil Spill Response Plan for Shell Incorporated’s plans for drilling in 
the Beaufort Sea. This occurred after the Bureau reviewed the plan and consulted with the other 
parties involved, including federal and state partners involved in the response, as Shell has 
proposed to begin “drilling up to four shallow water exploration wells in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea 
this summer, beginning on July 1”.362 This is an important step in the approvals process, 
although Shell would need well-specific drilling permits in order to begin drilling.  
The approval went through comprehensive review including internal, public, and 
interagency review, requiring Shell to prepare plans for different scenarios above and beyond 
their initial spill response plans. This included identifying a potential thirty-day worst case 
scenario should a spill occur, the equipment that would be necessary to control it, and the 
logistics of how this would be accomplished.
363
 As such, Shell has suggested that they will use 
“a well control containment capability that consists of a combination of a subsea capping stack, 
and surface separation equipment that will be located on a newly-built containment vessel” to be 
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inspected by the Bureau.
364
 Furthermore, Shell is required to comply with standards set by the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). These include conditions stipulating stringent 
safety protocols, such as the demonstration of a capping and containment systems and the 
requirement that Shell “employ an approved, site-specific bowhead whale monitoring program,” 
and halt operations by August 25.
365
 Resumption of activities would not be able to occur under 
these conditions “until nearby Native Alaskan villages have completed their subsistence hunts 
and Shell has received approval from BOEM”.366 This suggests that the drilling season is quite 
short, and that based on prior information, a relief well would likely not be operational. 
Accordingly, a similar process has been conceived of that provides for an environmental 
assessment of the area known as the Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment (BREA). The 
goal of this research is to provide the opportunity for a number of groups involved in the area to 
“prepare for oil and gas activity in the Beaufort Sea by: filling regional information and data 
gaps related to offshore oil and gas activities; and supporting efficient and effective regulatory 
decision-making by providing scientific and socio-economic information to all stakeholders,” 
including First Nations communities (namely the Inuvialuit), industry, academia and government 
(the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada).
367
 Currently, seventeen 
research projects are underway or will be underway, with a number of them seeking completion 
dates around 2015. These will attempt to “gather new regional information and assist regulators 
and Inuvialuit communities in understanding the Beaufort Sea environment” as it concerns 
hydrocarbon resource development.
368
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The research is comprehensive, seeking to detail numerous elements associated with the 
Beaufort Sea include the impact development will have on fish habitats and ecosystems, 
migratory bird patterns, and on sea ice (with the goal of creating a sea ice information database 
called CanICE).
369
 Similarly, scientists will be trying to forecast weather and ocean conditions in 
the Beaufort Sea, the net environmental benefits and costs associated with dispersants should a 
spill require response, and a delineation of the geomorphology of the continental shelf and ridges 
based on satellite and radar imagery, most significant to hydrocarbon resource development and 
the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the disputed area (though this is not the assessment’s 
stated purpose).
370
 This research is important, but incomplete presently, and is suggestive of the 
general attitude displayed in the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute as well. It is all very 
much in flux, remaining in a state of stagnation, perhaps until both the CLCS submission and the 
Beaufort Regional Assessment Program come to completion. 
Under these circumstances, the international legal regime currently in place supports the 
sovereign rights of nations to exploit undersea resources by providing incentives for this 
exploitation “without any intrinsic regard for the rational and efficient principles of sustainability 
and conservation”.371 Part of this has to do with Article 82 (1) of the UNCLOS, concerning 
resources beyond the exclusive economic zone, in which the coastal state is supposed to make 
financial contributions for the exploitation or resources beyond the continental shelf to the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA).
372
 Payments are to be made annually on an escalating 
scale after the first five years of production at a particular site, beginning at 1 percent of the 
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value or volume of production at the site, up to 7 percent after the twelfth year.
373
 The ISA will 
then distribute these funds to parties to the UNCLOS, “on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, 
taking into account the interests and needs of developing States, particularly the least developed 
and the land-locked among them”.374 
Arguably, Article 82 of the UNCLOS provides an incentive “for the coastal State 
concerned to exploit completely any hydrocarbon or other non-living resource found lying 
beyond the 200 nm limit of the continental shelf,” prior to the conclusion of the first five years of 
production.
375
 Similarly, a disincentive is established in the conservation and sustainable 
utilization of hydrocarbon resources, as well as the more generally accepted principle of 
permanent sovereignty over these resources. This is being balanced with environmental concern 
to evoke a duty to protect the environment or the resource rather than an absolute right to 
either.
376
 Even the Truman Proclamation of 1945 mentioned earlier sought to gain jurisdiction 
and sovereign control over such resources in order to conserve, sustain, and monitor natural 
resources during development so that they can be utilized appropriately and not rushed into use.  
In turn, sustainable development comes to imply the management of a resource through 
the maintenance of a balance between contradictory purposes: conservation and optimal 
utilization.
377
 By aiming to balance opposing interests and equitably distribute benefits, the 
pursuit of undersea hydrocarbon resources results in the espousal of more complex systems of 
governance that inevitably lead to further complication and strife, not to mention innumerable 
delays in coming to conclusive decisions. The CLCS decisions are but one example, with the 
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Commission having reviewed 56 submissions by 2011 and giving recommendations to only 11 at 
this point.
 378
  
This means that Canada’s submission could take a decade or more to review, hindering 
efforts at a potential reconciliation. It does not however halt discovery, exploration, or 
production of hydrocarbon resources and minerals in the area. A defense of sovereignty in this 
situation could be characterized as a preliminary effort to adequately delimit the maritime 
borders of Arctic coastal states and to quell their excitement over an abundance of hydrocarbon 
and mineral riches waiting to be unearthed. Given this context, sovereignty and international 
cooperation, though seemingly exclusive, are actually compatible as “sovereignty can facilitate 
cooperation by providing clear jurisdiction for regulating shipping and the extraction of natural 
resources”.379 This suggests that Canada and the US have no real interest in confrontation. 
Rather, with the US seeking accession to the UNCLOS, cooperation in mapping and resource 
extraction are even more realistic. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
The more precisely the position is determined, the less precisely the momentum is known in this 
instant, and vice versa.380 
 
The Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute demonstrates that strong linkages exist 
between maritime delimitations (disguised as threats to sovereignty) and energy development in 
the Canadian Arctic. Accordingly, Byers has identified different resolutions that may be 
available. Perhaps the most obvious is a negotiated boundary, dividing the disputed area in half 
between both nations.
381
 Canada and the US could seek to send the dispute to an international 
court, but precedent suggests that this could be risky; especially as in 1903 the US was awarded 
26,000 square kilometres (the Alaska Panhandle) in an arbitration case.
382
 Similarly, Canada and 
the US could bundle this dispute with others, connecting “the Beaufort Sea boundary to the 
resolution of the Northwest Passage dispute” or by connecting the Beaufort Sea maritime 
boundary dispute to the Dixon Entrance dispute, involving a 50 kilometer-wide body of water 
connecting the mainland coast to the open sea towards the southern end of the Alaskan coast 
where a salmon fishery exists.
383
  
Byers also suggests that Canada should recognize the Beaufort Sea disputed area as 
American territory, while the US should recognize the Dixon Entrance as Canadian, offering a 
creative trade-off without disrupting cooperative seabed mapping occurring presently. There is 
precedent for this involving Russia and Norway in 2008, where Russia accepted a Norwegian 
claim to fishing in the Svalbard Islands, and Norway accepted “a more westward dividing line 
for the continental shelf in the Barents Sea”.384 They could also attempt to agree on a joint 
                                               
380 Werner Heisenberg, American Institute of Physics, “The Uncertainty Principle, 1927,” updated 2012, available 
from: <http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08.htm>, (accessed June 13, 2012). 
381 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North, at 102. 
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384 Ibid., at 104. 
94 
 
arrangement whereby both nations share in the development of hydrocarbon resources in the 
disputed area, sharing in the benefits as well.
385
 
Moreover, settlement of this dispute will and must involve the Inuvialuit of the Yukon 
and the Northwest Territories, as much of the zone in question lies “within the Inuvialuit 
Settlement Region, which was established by the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement on the basis 
on the basis of the Canadian position concerning the international boundary,” as well as the 
Yukon North Slope, where “a special conservation regime protects wildlife and aboriginal 
harvesting interests”.386 Baker and Byers also point out that under Canadian law, the federal 
government “has a duty to consult, to limit any infringement of aboriginal rights as much as 
possible, to make any such limitation clear through an Act of Parliament, and to provide 
compensation”.387 Interestingly, the Inuvialuit have been having preliminary discussions with 
KOGAS, the Korean public natural gas company, on seeking to develop some of the natural gas 
resources located in the region; an intriguing proposition potentially threatening the conservation 
regime in place by those initially seeking to protect it.
388
 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty in this sense is a concept that McRae says “conjures up 
images of Canada losing its national heritage in the north,” of the United States “asserting rights 
over what is rightfully Canadian,” and images “of the sacrifices made by Canada’s indigenous 
people in the far north in order to secure what Canada claims as its own”.389 He further suggests 
that Canadian Arctic sovereignty is a powerful concept, and a federal government “that stood 
                                               
385 Ibid., at 103. 
386 Ibid., at 103. 
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silent in the face of a claim that Arctic sovereignty was in peril would be renouncing Canada’s 
history and the aspirations of its forbears”.390  
It is a principle that resounds loudly but has a narrow focus under international maritime 
law. Effectively, it concerns “the waters of the Arctic archipelago which encompass the various 
routes of the Northwest Passage,” but not the Beaufort Sea as this concerns an unresolved issue 
of maritime delimitation and the limits of the continental shelf.
391
 Sovereign rights to 
exploitation of natural resources, namely hydrocarbons, represent “a much more limited form of 
jurisdiction than is embodied in Canada’s sovereignty claim in respect of the waters of the Arctic 
Archipelago”.392 Instead, these are determined by the UNCLOS which “attempts for the first 
time to provide a global framework for the rational exploitation and conservation of the sea’s 
resources and the protection of the environment” while recognizing the importance of the 
freedom of navigation on the seas and basically acting as “a model for the evolution of 
international environmental law”.393 Canadian Arctic sovereignty is thus not threatened 
concerning the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute with the US. 
It is borders that are essential to this debate then, and these are dictated by the UNCLOS. 
However, the UNCLOS, as a flexible international legal mechanism with a rich historical basis, 
does not exist “in isolation from the real world or from existing structures of international law,” 
and thus requires “an understanding of the wider legal environment within which it operates”.394 
As such, it “has not remained static…and cannot be understood without reference to later 
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developments, including the recommendations of the Rio Conference,”395 as just one example of 
an influential document that, when taken together with the UNCLOS, provide a more 
comprehensive legal regime that can deal with most issues related to the seas, including the 
Arctic Ocean. 
Other issues arise when considering the effects of climate change on the Arctic Ocean 
and surrounding environment, as melting sea ice reveals previously unseen territory and adjusts 
coastal delimitations. The Arctic environment is harsh as it is, but is especially sensitive to “any 
additional sources of stress, both natural and human induced”.396 This has a profound effect on 
the ability of a state to access resources within their national jurisdiction as identified by the 
limitations set under the UNCLOS concerning the continental shelf under Article 76 and Article 
82.  
Consequently, the resources of the Beaufort Sea represent “a significant new source of oil 
and, more importantly, one under the regulation of, and financially beneficial to, the federal 
government”.397 This need for unexplored resources resembles the same pattern of behavior 
exhibited by early explorers seeking valuable resources in early maritime legal history, giving 
rise to early international maritime law in the form of mare liberum, mare nostrum, mare 
clausam,
398
 Vitorian jus gentium,
399
 and the Grotian mare liberum.
400
 In a more modern sense, 
the evolution of international maritime law can be described as the evolution of a demand for the 
protection of sovereign jurisdiction over national resources and potential natural resources, as 
well as the right to exploit these, under international law. 
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However, these resources also signify a resort to a new source of oil that is expensive to 
explore and produce. Parks notes that this is a symptom of the fact that oil and gas are being 
consumed faster and in increasingly larger quantities, causing government and industry to “stake 
out and bid upon remaining stocks, to feed insatiable domestic use and foreign markets, or to 
suspend them at will”.401 While these are important considerations to the present, there is also 
not a great sense of urgency to conclude this dispute, as technological and environmental 
limitations mean that drilling is geared toward the future and not a reality for the immediate 
term. In fact, a number of factors including environmental hazards, technological inefficiency, 
risk and willingness in instituting governmental regulation, all contribute to the slow progression 
of this dispute.  
The development of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute demonstrates the 
importance of the development of international law in territorial disputes, especially so given 
environmental change, evolving legal principles, and the natural resources to be claimed by 
coastal states. It is a dispute that is in the unique position of being on the frontlines of multiple 
changes, that is, the nexus between the defense of sovereignty as a policy priority, both 
domestically and in foreign affairs, and energy resource development.  
As such, it is possible that the status of the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute will 
change after Canada submits its scientific findings to the CLCS in 2013, but merely because the 
position of the dispute is known at this specific moment, does not mean that what may come of it 
is just as certain.
402
 Thus, it remains at a stalemate, and one with an indeterminate future. 
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